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Abstract 
Operations management tools can be applied to the operating room setting in order 
to improve throughput of the system.  This is important because of the limitation of 
resources and funds available to hospitals in the public healthcare system.  Hospitals must 
deal with variability in demand and uncertainty surrounding scheduling; these 
considerations can be placed in a queuing theory framework to better design processing 
capacity to minimize wait times and maximize utilization.  Lean techniques can be used 
to identify and reduce waste in processes.  A single centre experience is presented to 
demonstrate real-world application of these tools and to suggest foci for potential 
improvement in other centres. 
 
Keywords:  operations research; Lean management; queuing theory; healthcare operations; 
operating room utilization; surgery wait times. 
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1: Introduction 
Resource limitations are real in the Canadian public healthcare system.  In British 
Columbia, the media regularly reminds the public that health services are being cut in 
already under-serviced areas and that surgeries are being cancelled or operating rooms 
being closed because of budget limitations (Hunter, B.C. health authorities told to trim 
$360 million, 2009).  Unlike the private healthcare model that exists in other parts of the 
world, the health services industry that we depend upon for medically essential care does 
not generate revenues to support its operation.  Public hospitals and provincial health 
authorities are constrained by mandated budgets; they face increasing costs, but cannot 
pass those costs on to patients like a private enterprise would.  Recent acceleration in 
rising healthcare costs, due partially to an aging population and concomitant increasing 
demand, increasing prices of pharmaceuticals, and capital expenditure on equipment and 
health information technology, has outpaced government spending in British Columbia.  
Stakeholders in the system, including physicians and nurses, are increasingly alert to the 
possibility that our current standard of quality may not be sustainable. 
As health professionals charged with the responsibility of administering public 
health spending on behalf of the government but in the interest of the people, we 
physicians must consider novel approaches to reducing costs while constantly seeking 
improvement in quality and outcomes for our patients.  The professional culture of 
medicine in Canada guides physicians not to make medical decisions on the basis of 
costs; one would not prescribe an inferior course of treatment solely because it is less 
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expensive.  This is borne from the single-payer system that has been deeply entrenched in 
the public system and that improves access and equality.  At the same time, rationality 
informs most decision-making; unnecessary or marginally beneficial investigations are 
discouraged as a means to keep costs low.  Another approach to minimizing costs is to 
address inefficiencies in the system; the removal of non-value added steps or increasing 
utilization may result in greater sustainability in the long-term. 
Operations management techniques have only recently found their way to 
healthcare operations (Hunter, A clear vision for better health care, 2009).  The 
reluctance to translate industrial efficiency frameworks to health and human systems is 
likely the result of cultural resistance and the belief that health processes are somehow 
unique.  There exists a belief that humans, both the patients and the practitioners, are 
autonomous and should not be treated as widgets or cogs in a machine.  Healthcare 
processes, however, share considerable similarity to industrial processes: there are inputs 
and outputs linked by processes and these processes are subject to variability and the 
development of queues.  Clearly, healthcare processes are services rather than a 
manufacturing assembly line and can be appropriately described in service terms.  The 
intention of this essay is to increase understanding of these health processes within an 
operations management framework.  An example of the application of these concepts in a 
complex academic institution is used to illustrate potential opportunities in process 
redesign and efficiency gains.  It is intended that by framing these strategies in operations 
management, that benefits may be better communicated and translated to other 
institutions. 
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1.1 The operating room as a process 
Operating rooms (ORs) are known to be one of the largest cost centres of hospitals 
accounting for over 40% of expenses (Denton, Viapiano, & Vogl, 2007).  The costs 
associated with running the ORs include high fixed costs arising from the facilities, 
equipment, and other capital expenditure and high variable costs including nursing and 
allied health labour wages.  Physicians and surgeons, in Canada, are for the most part 
paid directly from the province on the basis of a fee-for-service schedule and in fact are 
not considered employees of the hospital at which they work; rather physicians are 
granted “privileges” to use the hospital facilities for their medical practice. 
Unlike in the United States, where most of the healthcare operations research is 
performed and where operating rooms function as profit centres, in Canada, the vast 
majority of hospitals are publicly owned and are provided with a fixed annual budget by 
each respective provincial government.  Each hospital’s board determines the allocation 
of its funds and resources to the various departments and hospital areas.  In British 
Columbia, an intermediate level of governance exists in that the province is currently 
divided into 5 regional and one province-wide health authorities.  Canadian hospitals, not 
uniquely, are facing increasing constraints in annual budgets as the cost of healthcare 
delivery steadily increases (Hunter, B.C. health authorities told to trim $360 million, 
2009) while governments pursue innovative yet costly initiatives such as reductions in 
CO2 emissions and carbon neutrality (Livesmart BC, 2009).  As operating rooms 
constitute a major component of hospital spending, it is logical to continually seek 
improvements to operating efficiency in order to limit costs while maintaining quality 
and continuing innovation. 
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The operating suite occupies a central position in the process of a hospital 
admission and surgical services are delivered in a number of different environments and 
contexts.  Figure 1.1 describes the flow of patients through a hospital admission. 
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Figure 1.1:  The operating suite is central to hospital operations 
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Entry to the operating room can occur as an inpatient or and an outpatient.  
Inpatients are admitted to the hospital prior to surgery through the emergency department 
or directly to the ward.  They have their surgery performed and then following recovery 
in the post-operative care unit or the intensive care unit, they return to the hospital ward 
before returning home.  Outpatients arrive to the operating room from home the morning 
of surgery and following surgery and postoperative recovery are returned home the same 
day.  Outpatient procedures are typically simple or short surgeries with low postoperative 
pain control difficulties, low risks of complications, and are performed on generally 
healthy people.  The need for surgery can be either elective or emergent.   
Elective surgery describes a procedure for a condition that is not immediately life-
threatening where a delay will not significantly increase risks of morbidity or mortality; 
elective surgery can be scheduled in advance and is almost exclusively performed during 
daytime hours.  Elective surgery is by no means always simple and routine.  Some 
elective procedures are highly complex and require the marshalling of extensive hospital 
resources and the cooperation of many services and can be associated with the potential 
of serious complications.  The term “elective” is effective in communicating a 
connotation of degree of urgency amongst healthcare workers or in the administration of 
policies.  The term, however, may belie the seriousness of the underlying condition or the 
degree of impairment or loss of function associated with injury; for example, many 
cancer surgery procedures (mastectomy for breast cancer, bowel resection for colon 
cancer, and others) or spine surgeries, or even open-heart coronary bypass surgery are 
considered elective as they can be scheduled in advance.       
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In contrast, emergency surgery describes procedures that must be performed within 
a certain time frame or risk the loss of “life, limb or organ.”  These surgeries enter the 
operating suite through the emergency room, the hospital ward, or through the intensive 
care units and often necessitate a long postoperative course in hospital.  Examples of 
emergency surgery include the control of bleeding in penetrating chest trauma, 
craniotomy to control bleeding from a ruptured aneurysm, ruptured appendicitis, 
fractured femur from a fall, or organ transplantation amongst many others.  These 
surgeries may arrive at any time throughout the day and on any day of the week and 
multiple emergency surgeries may arrive simultaneously at a tertiary referral hospital.  
Each situation or surgery is associated with a time frame within which surgery should 
optimally be performed in order to minimize risk of morbidity or mortality.  This time 
frame will depend upon the specific type of underlying condition, the severity of the 
condition, and the co-morbid status of the patient, in other words, the other issues and 
extenuating status of the patient.  The surgeon who assesses the patient and requests the 
operating room determines the time frame within which surgery must be performed; 
commonly, a surgical procedure required within 24 hours is considered an emergency.  
Requirements amongst emergency surgeries, however, can range from less than 24 hours 
to immediate.  Appendix A lists a number of surgical procedures and their associated 
urgency.  
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1.2 Scheduling elective and emergency surgery 
Efficient scheduling of surgery in a large hospital with several operating rooms is 
fraught with significant complexity.  ORs typically have a planned utilization time 
beyond which labour costs accrue significantly; therefore a constant pressure exists to 
optimize the number of cases that are being performed within that time. However, even 
the elective surgical environment suffers from a high degree of variability.  This 
variability stems from individual differences in patients, differences in their pathology, 
and differences in skill and technique of the practitioners including surgeons, 
anaesthesiologists, nurses, and trainees.   Two systems for scheduling surgery are block 
scheduling and open scheduling (Denton, Viapiano, & Vogl, 2007).   
1.2.1 Block scheduling 
In block scheduling, individual surgeons or surgical departments are assigned 
blocks of time in individual ORs on a set schedule (for example, general surgeon Dr. 
Smith is assigned 8 hours of time in OR#2 each and every Monday).  The surgeon then 
books her own elective cases into her allotted time such that the mean duration of her 
cases fits within the block of time.  The surgeon may be responsible for filling the entire 
available time or his or her colleagues from the same surgical service may be allowed to 
fill in any remaining time.  Commonly OR#2 would also be used for general surgery on 
other days but with another surgeon from that service occupying that time. 
Block scheduling allows for specialization of operating rooms and its associated 
staff and equipment.  For example, as neurosurgery differs significantly from orthopaedic 
joint reconstruction surgery, the highly specialized microscope used for micro-dissection 
can be housed inside the neurosurgery operating room, while the image intensifier or X-
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ray machines can be located near the orthopaedic and trauma rooms.  In the same 
arrangement, surgical scrub nurses can specialize in certain surgical subspecialties so that 
they perform with greater consistency and speed.  The specialization of operating room 
nurses into teams of specialization has been shown to increase employee satisfaction 
amongst nurses (Sprengel, Snell, & Boissoneau, 1993).  
1.2.2 Open scheduling 
In the open scheduling system, all surgeons submit cases up until the day of surgery 
and these cases are scheduled into various ORs such that all are accommodated.  The 
same operating room may be scheduled to accommodate different surgeons and different 
surgical specialties on any given day.  Emergency surgeries are often scheduled into an 
emergency operating room in an open system. 
One advantage of the open scheduling system is that the available operating room 
time can be fully utilized as long as there is a queue of cases available to be scheduled, 
unlike in the block system where surgeons are allocated time whether or not they have 
the need for it on a given day. On the other hand, emergency surgeries are subject to 
more randomness in arrivals and the time required to perform surgery, resulting in 
adverse consequences on operating room utilization, as discussed in Chapter 2.  
1.2.3 Emergency scheduling 
Emergency surgery complicates scheduling in operating rooms by introducing 
increased uncertainty.  Emergency procedures can be booked at any time of the day and 
can have a variable window of time within which they must be done.  Moreover, 
emergency surgeries, because of their unpredictable nature, can have different resource 
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demands.  For example, an emergency multiple digit (finger) replant surgery may require 
one or two surgeons, two nurses and an anaesthesiologist but may require several hours 
of operating time.  In contrast, an emergency Caesarean section may require two 
surgeons, two or three surgical nurses, an anaesthesiologist, a paediatrician and a team of 
neonatal nurses but only 45 minutes of operating time.  In a small community hospital 
with only a few operating rooms, the difficulty of accommodating extra or add-on 
surgery is easily apparent; if emergency surgery is to be done in a timely way, elective 
surgery will need to be delayed until the room or another room and its staff becomes 
available.  This delay may extend several hours or the delay may force the postponement 
of the surgery to another day.  
Large centres face similar dilemmas, although a larger number of rooms are 
available to accommodate add-on surgical cases, these rooms are already maximally 
scheduled to optimize the number of cases being performed.  If already maximally 
utilized, diverting an operating room to attend to an emergency case will still force a 
delay and possible postponement just as in the small hospital.  Large centres, because of 
the nature of the tertiary referral process (wherein complex or high-acuity cases are 
funnelled from local and regional hospitals into a small number of specialized centres), 
face the situation of emergency add-on surgery far more frequently and often with more 
complex, time and resource consuming procedures. 
The question that can then be asked is: does there exist a system of scheduling that 
accounts for the variability and uncertainty that emergency surgeries introduce to the 
already variable nature of operating room scheduling that is able to maximize the 
utilization of the resources of the operating room, while still achieving other important 
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goals, including sustaining high quality of care (as measured in general by morbidity and 
mortality or more specifically by the rate of complication or the need for “redo” surgery),  
minimizing excessive costs (such as overtime pay for surgical teams), and maintaining or 
even reducing surgical wait times?   
The following chapter will describe operations management in the context of the 
operating room setting.  Lean management and queuing theory will be introduced as 
frameworks that help to shape strategic decisions about redesigning various operating 
room processes and scheduling in order to deal with this unique variability.  Additionally, 
metrics will be discussed that guide improvements and form the basis of benchmarking 
within the industry.  The third section of this paper will discuss the efforts of the 
Vancouver General Hospital to redesign several of its practices, framed within an 
operations approach, in order to better achieve targets for its performance, utilization, and 
quality in the operating room. 
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2: Operations Management in the Operating Room Setting 
2.1 Queuing theory 
The operating room and the progress of a patient through the operative experience 
can be thought of as a service process that has an input (the patient requiring surgery), a 
service (the operation and recovery period), and an output (the patient discharged home 
or to the hospital ward or intensive care unit, or patient expiry).  As with any resource 
constrained process there is a limited capacity and should demand overwhelm capacity a 
queue will necessarily form.  The mathematical tool devised to optimize service 
processes in which queues form was first described by A. K. Erlang (Queuing Theory, 
2009) in the early 1900s and is termed “queuing theory”.  In attempting to determine the 
number of switches required to handle telephone calls arriving at a switchboard, Erlang 
concluded that the two key variables to determining the optimal, or fewest, number of 
switches required to produce a tolerably short wait time for callers were the length of 
each telephone call and the time between arrivals of calls.  Applications of this theory 
have been extended to countless management and business scenarios including 
determining the number of bank tellers required to limit the length of time patrons stand 
in line, or optimizing the supermarket checkout and the development of express checkout 
lanes. 
There have been many applications to healthcare as well, including of particular 
interest, application to emergency room wait times (Schlechter, 2009) and level of 
staffing (Fomundam & Herrmann, 2007) as well as the surgical treatment of trauma 
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patients requiring emergency operations.  The latter study (Tucker, Barone, Cecere, 
Blabey, & Rha, 1999) looked specifically at the need to call in a second operating room 
team at night in order to deal with the formation of a queue of trauma surgery cases.  This 
solution deals with only a single attribute of the system as described by queuing theory, 
the number of servers or channels.  The number of channels describes the capacity of the 
system to process inputs simultaneously (in this context, number of operating rooms). 
There are other parameters of service processes and queue formation that can be 
characterized and effectively modified to alter the performance of the system, as 
elaborated below (Anupindi, Chopra, Desmukh, Van Mieghem, & Zemel, 2006). 
The emergency surgery process can be described in terms of queuing theory by the 
parameters (1) arrival of patients which can be measured as a rate or an interval time 
between arrivals, (2) service which is specified best by the length of time required for the 
surgical procedure, (3) the number of service channels which describes the number of 
available operating rooms, (4) the number of queues which are allowed to form and (5) 
queue discipline (e.g., the ability of one surgery to “bump” another based on personnel, 
equipment, logistical reasons and the prioritization of certain cases over others).   
Arrivals to the operating room are subject to considerable variability and 
uncertainty.  Variability in this context refers to the potential distribution of all possible 
events.  Intuitively, the arrival of emergency patients does not follow a predictable 
pattern and there is considerable randomness to arrivals such that inputs cannot be 
considered deterministic.  Uncertainty describes the somewhat different element of errors 
in prediction that arise from insufficient information..  For this essay variability and 
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uncertainty will be treated as the same and will be used interchangeably.  They both 
introduce the need for greater capacity and/or inventory into the queuing system.  
Historical patient arrival data for individual institutions may suggest some 
patterned behaviour but overlaid by elements of randomness; inputs to this queuing 
model have been considered by other authors as “stochastic” (Lamiri, Xie, Dulgui, & 
Grimaud, 2008) and can be described in terms of a mean (the average number of patients 
arriving in a given time period) and a standard deviation.  Similarly, the length of time 
required for a surgical procedure is not constant and again there is considerable 
variability and uncertainty.  For example, a patient who has sustained a life threatening 
poly-trauma may occupy an operating room for several hours if his injuries are survivable 
or repairable or he may succumb to his injuries within minutes of starting surgery if the 
sustained trauma is severe enough.  The extent of the injuries may be unknown until a 
surgeon has been able to directly assess them and so accurate predictions of the length of 
time required in the operating room cannot be achieved with any certainty, Some 
surgeries can be completed in less than one hour and some may require several hours.  
Herein is one substantial difference between elective surgical scheduling and emergency 
scheduling; there is less, although not zero, variability in service processing time for 
elective procedures and arrival times are controlled.  This allows for greater utilization 
rates as will be discussed below. 
The fifth attribute of prioritization of service and queue discipline warrants special 
consideration with respect to emergency surgery.  The term emergency surgery 
encompasses a broad range of urgencies and surgeries are attached a prioritization based 
upon urgency and the length of delay associated with increases in morbidity or mortality.  
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Many examples of prioritization exist in medicine that are not necessarily seen in many 
other service or queuing examples.  The emergency department triage system designed 
and utilized in Canada, the Canadian Triage and Acuity Scale is an example of 
prioritization wherein the most serious emergency cases such as chest pain, or loss of 
consciousness are seen first over less serious emergencies such as cuts or other injuries.  
In emergency surgery scheduling, cases are given a prioritization (in decreasing order) of 
(1) less than one hour or STAT case, (2) less than eight hours, (3) less than 24 hours, or 
prioritization (4) “urgent elective.”  Increased complexity to the queuing model is 
introduced by this set of prioritizations: cases cannot be processed through the queue 
strictly on a first-in, first-out basis, nor can lower priority (priority 3 or 4) cases be put on 
hold indefinitely in order to wait and accommodate more urgent cases.  Within a given 
level of prioritization, a first-in, first-out system can be used but even within this 
simplification there may be numerous adjustments based on availability of specialty 
nursing staff, preparation or turnover of specialized tools and equipment, and agreements 
between surgeons to “bump” one another, or availability of a particular surgeon to do a 
particular procedure as the surgeon may be otherwise occupied in the emergency 
department or elsewhere in the hospital. 
A copy of the prioritization protocol for the Vancouver Acute hospital is shown in 
Appendix B and a graphical depiction is seen in Figure 3.2 in Chapter 3. 
2.2 Utilization 
Further, the process can be described in terms of performance characteristic and 
benchmarked in terms of metrics, of which, utilization is a key measure.  The raw 
utilization of the operating room resources is equal to the time that patients are occupying 
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the operating room (service length) divided by the available resource hours (Kindscher & 
Rockford, 2009). The adjusted utilization describes the same calculation but factoring in 
setup and turnover time for each procedure; this represents a truer reflection of utilization 
of the operating room.   
Described in terms of queuing theory, utilization is the throughput divided by the 
resource capacity.  Strum, et al. defined the terms overutilization and underutilization as 
applied to OR scheduling (Strum, Vargas, & May, 1999).  Overutilization is the time 
used by scheduled cases past the end of scheduled time and underutilization is the 
converse.  While utilization is commonly used to track surgery performance and to 
allocate blocks of surgical time, there is no clear optimal utilization, where the economic 
costs of staffing potential overutilization is balanced with the risk of underutilization, 
although some authors have attempted to determine it under specific conditions (Tyler, 
Pasquariello, & Chen, 2003).    Most operating rooms in the United States seek a 
utilization of 70 to 85%.  More aggressive utilization targets force the trade-off of 
availability of operating time for surgeons to book new patients and risk decreases in 
patient satisfaction (Kindscher & Rockford, 2009).  Expressed in terms of efficiency, a 
low utilization in the face of high fixed costs is a reflection of wasted resources and 
inefficiency while utilization in excess of 100% represents additional costs associated 
with overtime nursing wages or surgeon and anaesthesiologist discomfort and resistance 
(ibid).  Even high utilization (85% or higher) is considered inefficient because of the 
inability to deal with variable demand; in effect, a highly utilized system lacks adequate 
surge capacity to meet excessive inputs. 
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It has been shown that an increase in variability of case duration reduces the 
achievable utilization (Tyler, Pasquariello, & Chen, 2003).  This trade-off between 
variability and utilization can be depicted by a throughput-delay curve such as the one 
shown in Figure 2.1; Tyler has modelled this trade-off as it relates to the operating room 
setting (ibid): 
Figure 2.1:  Tyler’s model of a throughput delay curve for OR utilization 
 
 
 
This model helps to illustrate one of the fundamental trade-offs in the operations 
management triangle described by Lovejoy (1998).  This author described the 
relationship between capacity, variability and inventory (queue length) schematically as: 
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Figure 2.2:  Lovejoy’s OM Triangle 
 
 
 
 
 
The principle behind the Operations Management triangle can be derived 
mathematically with Little’s Law and the Pollaczek-Khinchin (PK) formula (Appendix 
C).  The PK formula, while derived for a single-server model and based on an assumption 
of a first-in, first out process, can be generalized to the more complex scenario such as 
emergency operation scheduling.   
Qualitatively, it suggests that there are necessary trade-offs between capacity, 
variability, and inventory or buffers.  An ideal system would be one where capacity is 
fully utilized despite maximal variability and minimal inventory; applied to the operating 
room, the ideal system would be able to deal with any surgical case with 100% utilization 
of its operating room resources without the need to maintain a long queue of waiting 
surgical cases.  This of course is not a feasible system; trade-offs necessitate that if 
variability is high, then capacity is underutilized and the buffer size (patient queue) is 
large.  If the goal of the system is to minimize queue size, then either capacity must be 
increased or variability decreased, or both (Lovejoy, 1996).  
We have already discussed how emergency surgery is associated with a greater 
amount of variation for operation duration and so utilization is expected to be low or 
Capacity 
Inventory 
Variability or 
Information 
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waiting time for surgery is expected to be high.  Posed as a queuing problem then, we 
may ask, can any of the parameters of the queue be manipulated in order to achieve a 
more optimal design of tolerable waiting times, cost-effective capacity utilization and 
reasonable accommodation of variability? 
The added complexity to this system is that it is not a simple, single-server, first-in, 
first-out process.  Additional operating rooms may be employed at night for special 
situations (transplant surgery, cardiac surgery, other subspecialty procedures), and there 
is a formal prioritization of certain cases over others.  Emergency scheduling is especially 
complex in large tertiary referral hospital where emergency demand is high both day and 
night and elective surgeries are already scheduled to optimize utilization.  The experience 
of one large teaching hospital, the Vancouver Acute site of the Vancouver Coastal Health 
Authority in British Columbia will be discussed in Chapter 3.  Vancouver Acute, also 
known as the Vancouver General Hospital (VGH) has put in place initiatives that attempt 
to deal with the variability component of the OM triangle in order to achieve targets of 
tolerable wait times for urgent (priority 4) and emergent (priority 1 to 3) surgical cases. 
2.3 Lean management in the operating room 
In addition to queuing theory, another relevant operations management framework 
is the concept of “lean production”.  Lean tools and techniques have recently and 
increasingly been applied to a wide variety of healthcare applications including office 
appointment scheduling, hospital bed allocation and emergency room visits (Fomundam 
& Herrmann, 2007), (Schlechter, 2009).  Lean and other operations tools have also found 
application and benefit in the operating room primarily with regards to supply chain 
management and reducing inventory levels to reduce unnecessary costs and in 
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minimizing excessive movement of patients and healthcare providers to improve 
efficiency through such strategies as the implementation of factory flow and fixed 
position processing (Slack, Chambers, & Johnston, 2007), and ensuring quality while 
reducing costs (Spear, 2005).  There are numerous tools in the Lean framework in 
addition to queuing theory that can be carried over to the planning and sequencing of 
emergency surgery in a complicated tertiary referral centre. 
The Toyota Production System (TPS) on which the Lean framework is based, 
describes seven categories of waste in a manufacturing or production system 
(McLaughlin & Hays, 2008).  Of the seven, six have direct parallels in healthcare 
services and some can be applied in a more abstract fashion.  Waste in the operating 
room can arise from overproduction, excessive waiting, unnecessary transportation, 
unnecessary motion of providers, over-processing and inventory.   
Overproduction refers to initiating production prior to the demand; in the OR this 
refers to setting up instruments or specialized equipment for a surgical case that has not 
been confirmed or that is eventually bumped by another higher priority case.  Waste is 
incurred in having to spend time and cost repackaging and sterilizing open equipment.   
Waiting is perhaps the most obvious dimension of waste in the OR; patients may 
wait several hours in the emergency room after a surgical booking is made but prior to 
being transported to the operating room.  This waiting time incurs costs upstream by 
preventing patient flow in the emergency room, and incurs costs to the patient because 
prolonged delays may result in increased morbidity.  Waiting can also occur at or prior to 
several other steps in the process as illustrated in value stream map, Figure 2.3.  Waiting 
occurs on the ward prior to being called to the operating room, in the preoperative 
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holding area, in the operating room prior to induction of anaesthesia, and after surgery 
but before being cleared to enter the recovery room and more.  Waiting parallels the 
concept of queue formation in queuing theory. 
Transportation and motion of providers lead to waste by contributing to additional 
time not being utilized in direct care of the patient.  For example, waste arises if the 
circulating nurse must make repeated trips into the operating room sterile core to retrieve 
specialized equipment, incurring procedure delays, opportunities for miscommunication, 
and opportunities for injury, when the same equipment may be stored directly in the 
operating room or immediately adjacent to the room.  
 Over-processing in the OR environment refers to redundant or unnecessary steps in 
surgical care ranging from excessive or duplicate documentation, to performing surgery 
and finding no pathology.  The role of over-processing in medicine may differ from its 
role in manufacturing.  In manufacturing processes, steps that are deemed to not add 
value may be eliminated without affecting the finished product.  In medicine, over-
processing is built into the system because it serves as contingency against human error.  
Where there are multiple layers of redundancy, it is less likely that an error will be 
carried forth (Gaba, Fish, & Howard, 1993).   
Inventory, in the context of the Lean production system, refers to the holding or 
purchasing of raw materials including supplies, for example prosthetic joints of many 
different sizes, coronary stents, and pharmaceuticals.  Inventory can also refer to work-in-
process and as such can also refer to patients in a queue (which then relates to waiting 
time). 
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Further, because of the uncertainty inherent in diagnosis and imperfect diagnostic 
testing, few tests are truly 100% specific or sensitive.  That is, in any diagnosis there is a 
chance that the result may be, in evidence based medicine parlance, a false-positive (type 
1 error) or a false-negative (type 2 error). In order to minimize the number of false-
negative results, our diagnostic tests may result in a greater number of false-positive 
results.  These false-positives may rarely result in unnecessary surgery.  A classical 
example is that of appendicitis.  Prior to the invention of the CT scanner and the 
abdominal ultrasound, acute appendicitis was entirely a clinical diagnosis based upon a 
classical history and certain physical examination findings.  Patients were often urgently 
operated on in the middle of the night to find that in fact the appendix was normal.  This 
was, and often still is, considered appropriate practice because it minimizes the number 
of missed cases of true acute appendicitis.  Historically, the quality of a general surgeon 
was measured as much by the number of unnecessary surgeries he performed as the 
number of actually necessary ones. 
2.3.1 Value-added steps in the OR process 
The operating room and the services provided therein can be approached from two 
different perspectives. It can be viewed in terms of a manufacturing system with 
inventories such as surgical instruments and devices and work in process, and 
transportation of equipment and the movement of workers, all of which can be targeted 
for efficiency improvements; this approach is well described in operations management 
research.  By contrast, the system can be viewed more globally as a process through 
which an input, the patient, progresses through a series of steps resulting in a completed 
surgery, or the output.   
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The process can be illustrated through a value stream map.  The value stream map 
includes all the steps in the process experienced by the patient including value-added and 
non-value-added steps.  By identifying specific steps that are unnecessary and non-value-
added, significant waste can be eliminated.  The value stream map of a surgical patient 
entering the process of the operating room can be depicted as in Figure 2.3: 
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Figure 2.3:  Value stream map of operating room process 
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Whether a process step is deemed of added value in the private healthcare setting or 
pay-for-service setting such as we see often in the United States, can be based upon 
whether or not the patient would be willing to pay for that particular service step.  
Clearly, a step such as an anaesthesiologist’s preoperative examination, or administration 
of prophylactic antibiotics would be considered as value-added steps, but lying on a 
stretcher in the preoperative holding area, having fasted for 12 hours while the surgery 
immediately preceding yours runs overtime, would not be value-added.  In a single-payer 
system where the payer is a third party such as we have in Canada or in the case of 
private insurance, this question of value-added from the patient perspective becomes less 
well defined.  One option is simply to continue to consider the process from a payer 
perspective; would a third party or government payer pay for a particular process step.  
However, for another party to determine whether or not they are willing to pay for the 
service, some more objective measure may need to be introduced.  Instead, another 
option may be to consider whether or not the process step directly or indirectly affects the 
outcome of the patient.  A step that is considered value-added is one that reduces 
mortality and/or morbidity and a step that is non-value-added is one that reduces or has 
no effect on patient outcome.  In both scenarios, the most common non-value-added 
activity is waiting (McLaughlin & Hays, 2008).  Patients would not independently pay to 
wait longer and for most surgical procedures, waiting beyond a certain length of time has 
a negative impact on outcomes. 
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2.3.2 Standardization of processes 
A core component of Lean is the standardization of work processes.  In the hospital 
operating room setting, processes can be standardized in the form of written 
documentation, and step-by-step codification of best practices.  Clinical pathways for 
specific types of surgeries are examples of standardized work.  The Massachusetts 
General Hospital (MGH) developed a care path for coronary artery bypass surgery that 
detailed the optimal timing of specific interventions and clearly identified goals of care 
for the patient in the day prior to surgery, the day after surgery and in the post-surgical 
days following.  This initiative resulted in a 1.5 day reduction in average length of stay 
and cost savings (Wheelwright & Weber, 2004).  Many hospital intensive care units use 
standardized pre-printed order sets for such routine processes as admission to the ICU, 
dialysis, feeding, and electrolyte replacement.  These standardized orders do not dictate 
medical care or replace decision making but instead ensure no requisite orders are 
forgotten and that significant errors in notation or interpretation by ancillary staff are not 
made.  This in effect improves efficiency by saving time, reducing subsequent 
redundancy, and decreasing the rate of error. 
2.3.3 The operating room as the bottleneck 
A bottleneck dictates the throughput of the entire system.  In British Columbia, 
waitlists extend months for some procedures (Ministry of Health Services, 2009) and 
preoperative patients occupy beds meant for postoperative recovery because there is 
insufficient operating room availability.  In the process of both elective surgery and 
emergency surgery, the resources that comprise the operating suite act as the bottleneck.  
These resources include staff as well as equipment and physical space; all of these are 
  27 
restrained by a limited budget that does not adequately reflect demand ; (Hunter, B.C. 
health authorities told to trim $360 million, 2009).  These resources are represented by 
the number of available operating rooms and the hours that they are available.  It is 
expected that improving the performance of the bottleneck operation should result in 
overall increased throughput and improved patient flow through the hospital.  
2.3.4 Benefits of Lean  
Up to this point, we have described the Lean operations framework and the theory 
underlying queuing.  These tools will be qualitatively applied to the operating room 
setting in particular to describe how these tools can improve patient flow even in 
emergency cases that cannot be prescheduled and are complicated by significant 
variability in types of surgery and uncertainty in length of surgery duration. 
One potential means to improve patient flow therefore is through the reduction of 
variability of cases presenting for surgery by limiting the allowable types of surgery.  If a 
further reduction of variability cannot be achieved, then an alternative may be to reduce 
uncertainty surrounding the variability by improving our tools of prediction.  
Unfortunately, there remains a component of demand that is clearly random.  Trauma 
events such as motor vehicle accidents or gun violence, or accidents leading to mass 
casualty are not predictable and therefore operations that are able to maximize utilization 
and efficiencies despite variability must be incorporated into operating room practices. 
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2.4 Benchmarking 
Management consultants in the industry have identified a number of key 
performance indicators for operating room performance (OR Benchmarks, 2009).  The 
standard indicators used in benchmarking within the industry include (McKesson, 2009): 
 Prime-time (0700H to 1700H) Utilization 
 Start-Time Accuracy  
o First case of the day (+/- 5 minutes indicated on OR schedule) 
o Subsequent cases (+/- 15 minutes from time indicated on OR 
schedule) 
 Case Time Effectiveness 
o Patient incision to close (skin-to-skin) time 
o Turnover time 
 Estimated Case-Duration Accuracy (+/- 15 minutes from estimated time) 
 Add-on Rate Day of Surgery (percent of cases added on day of surgery) 
 Total Volume 
 Quality Measures 
o Percent return to surgery within 24 hours 
o Compliance with surgical time out 
o Percent patients screened prior to surgery 
 
These key performance indicators suggest processes that can be improved.  In the 
following section strategies will be discussed that attempt to Lean the OR process by 
emphasizing value-added steps and minimizing non-value-added steps or that aim to 
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reduce or work around the variability of demand and uncertainty placed upon operating 
rooms dealing with emergencies. 
 
2.5 Strategies 
Lean strategies have been applied to inventory and supply chain management 
successfully in the operating room (Noon, Schiffer, & Crane, 2009), (Patterson, 2009) 
(Epstein & Dexter, 2000).  Lean techniques applied to scheduling may similarly improve 
efficiency and increase utilization.  Consideration will be given to strategies that apply to 
elective, scheduled procedures and those that address the uncertain demand of emergency 
add-on procedures. 
The strategies that will be described include (1) reducing wait times (non-value 
added steps) through aiming to start cases on time and reducing turnaround times, (2) 
precisely predicting the actual length of surgical procedures (reducing uncertainty), (3) 
adding emergency operating rooms dedicated to specific surgical services (increasing 
processing channels), and (4) incorporating hybrid scheduling (improving utilization by 
reducing unscheduled time). 
2.5.1 On-Time Starts 
Tardy operating room starts have long been recognized as a source of waste in the 
system and attempts to quantify the impact of these late starts have been made (Dexter & 
Epstein, 2009), (Overdyk, Harvey, Fishman, & Shippey, 1998).  Dexter demonstrated 
that each minute of tardiness in the start of the first case translated into almost 1.2 
minutes of extra operating room costs for a room scheduled to run for at least eight hours. 
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In one academic centre, the measured incidence of tardiness was approximately 70% in 
one quarter with 15% of first cases starting twenty or more minutes later than scheduled.  
The first case of the day, one would expect, would be associated with the least  amount of 
uncertainty and would be most expected to start on time; however, the observed 
incidence of tardiness is strikingly high (Leibovitz, 2003).  Reducing tardiness and 
ensuring on time starts is clearly an obvious target for improvement.   
Numerous factors contribute to late starts.  Organized simply, these fall into three 
broad categories: (1) personnel factors, (2) patient factors, and (3) equipment factors 
(Leibovitz, 2003), (Kindscher & Rockford, 2009), (Shelver & Winston, 2001).   
2.5.1.1 Personnel 
The operating room nursing staff is responsible for setting up and laying out the 
operating room and surgical instruments prior to the first case of the day.  After the room 
is set up, one nurse is responsible for seeing the patient in the preoperative area and 
bringing the patient to the room.  Prior to the patient being brought to the room however, 
the patient must be seen and assessed by the anaesthesiologist and often is seen by the 
surgeon who must mark the appropriate site of surgery if the procedure is unilateral.  In 
many centres, the sequence cannot be altered; for example, the surgeon must see the 
patient and mark the site of surgery before that patient can proceed into the operating 
room or in other situations, the surgeon must be physically in the building before 
anaesthesia can be induced.  Delay in any of these personnel (nursing staff, 
anaesthesiologist, surgeon) will delay the start of surgery. 
Operating room culture has been identified as the most responsible contributor for 
staff-related tardiness of first case starts.  It has been shown (Shelver & Winston, 2001) 
  31 
that nursing staff members require support and encouragement to reduce tardniness and 
absenteeism.  A surgeon who is repeatedly unavailable at the expected start time will 
effectively discourage the nursing staff from being ready at the specified time which over 
time and in turn will lead the surgeon to the conclusion that the room is never ready on 
time anyways so there is no need to be on time either (Truong, Tessler, Kleiman, & 
Bensimon, 1996). 
In order to address personnel contributions, buy-in by the key stakeholders is 
required.  Some centres have been successful in reducing staff related tardiness by 
obtaining support from surgeons, anaesthesiologists, and nursing staff (Shelver & 
Winston, 2001).  Buy-in can be encouraged by both intrinsic and extrinsic incentive and 
reward.  An intrinsic incentive may be the promise of recognition amongst peers while an 
example of an intrinsic reward is the improved interpersonnel dynamic and team work 
that is encouraged by a smooth start each day.  The most direct extrinsic reward is 
monetary; by starting the surgery on time, the day is more likely to finish early or on 
time.  For the surgeon and anaesthesiologist who are remunerated per procedure, the 
early finish allows them to move on to the next task and for the nursing staff in many 
centres, an early finish allows them to leave early.  The simplest incentive is to pay 
nurses their full wage yet allow them to leave early if their slated surgeris are complete.  
The Shelver group at St. Luke’s Hospital (2001) initiated a star system where the names 
of surgeons, anesthesiologists and nurses who were responsible for on-time starts were 
posted publically and stars were pinned next to the names each time an on-time start was 
achieved. 
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2.5.1.2 Patient 
Patient-specific factors that may cause delay of the first case include late arrival of 
patients to the admitting department, unprocessed paperwork or incomplete laboratory 
investigations, and difficult intravenous access.  While it is out of the control of the 
operating room if a patient arrives to the hospital tardy for their surgery, effort can be 
made to streamline or increase the capacity of the admission process in order to 
accommodate late arrivers in order to reduce any impact on the schedule.  In terms of 
value-added, the admissions step of the process is not considered a value-added step but 
it is necessary.  The minimal amount of time possible should be spent in admitting.  
Commonly surgical admitting is physically separated from main hospital admitting and 
multiple patients may be processed by multiple channels simulatenously.  Laboratory 
investigations that are initiated in the preoperative holding area should be prioritized 
understanding that some tests require 45 minutes or more to complete.  Preadmission and 
preassessment by the anaesthesiologist in a clinic on a day prior to surgery has 
significantly improved the admission process and decreased the incidence of incomplete 
investigation and substantial delays (Conway, Golberg, & Chung, 1992).  The admission 
paperwork can be completed prior to surgery such that on the morning of surgery, the 
patient need only check in at the desk and not complete any extra paperwork.   
2.5.1.3 Equipment 
The vast majority of operating facilities utilize the case cart system of organizing 
surgical supplies (Golen, 2001), (OR Benchmarks, 2000).  Sterilized equipment is packed 
in advance of the surgery onto rolling carts that are delivered from the central processing 
department of a hospital to the operating room.  Commonly, case carts for each individual 
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surgery planned for the day are delivered during the night so that the minimal time is 
spent during turnaround periods retrieving supplies.  The case carts are assembled for 
each particular procedure based on a “pick-list” that the surgeon and operating room 
nurses have worked together to formulate.  If multiple similar procedures are planned for 
the same day, facilities required an inventory of duplicate supplies such that there is 
adequate time for used equipment to return to central processing, be sterilized, and 
repackaged onto a subsequent case cart. 
Case carts for the first case of the day are typically more reliable in terms of 
availability of equipment because there is ample time to prepare and package equipment.  
Delays can occur however if equipment from the first case cart must be used for an 
emergency procedure immediately prior to the scheduled first case and insufficient time 
is available to “flash” or quickly sterilize the item.  As well, errors in preparation of the 
case carts may lead to delays.   
2.5.2 Reducing turnaround times 
The time between surgical cases is time when the operating room is not being 
utilized for its primary purpose, the performance of surgery.  Unanticipated long or slow 
turnover of the operating room contributes to delayed completion of the elective surgical 
slate, cancellations of procedures, and cost over-runs.  Inefficiencies in the turnover 
process become compounded when an operating room is responsible for a high number 
of procedures per day.   
Unfortunately, there are differences in measures of turnover time because of the 
lack of a standardized definition for the beginning and end of the turnover period.  The 
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definition differs from surgeon to surgeon and from surgeon to anaesthesiologist to 
operating room manager.  One definition of the turnover time is the time between 
surgical closure of one case until the surgical incision of the next, this can also be termed 
the non-operative time (Harders, Malangoni, Weight, & Sidhu, 2006).  This definition is 
the one commonly adopted by surgeons as it discretely divides the available operating 
room time into two divisions: surgical and non-surgical time.  The surgical time for each 
procedure is simply the time between first incision to closure, commonly called the “skin-
to-skin” time.  Surgical skin-to-skin time is the basis for schedule planning and operating 
room allocation; however, difficulty in estimating surgical time and its surrounding 
variability is a key factor leading to inefficiency is scheduling.  This will be discussed in 
detail in the subsequent section.   
Decreasing the turnover time between surgical cases is equivalent to the Lean 
technique of Single Minute Exchange of Dies (SMED) that was developed by Shigeo 
Shingo for automobile manufacturing in Japan (Slack, Chambers, & Johnston, 2007).  
The goal of SMED is to compress time for set-up activities in order to decrease batch 
size, and inventory size.  When applied to a service industry such as a hospital operating 
room, where batch size and inventory are less relevant measures, SMED aims to reduce 
set-up time which will in turn increase capacity.  Non-surgical time, or turnover time in 
the former definition, is comprised of a number of discrete steps.  These steps can be 
considered in terms of internal and external set-up.  By converting internal set-up to 
external set-up and streamlining both, significant reductions in turnover time may be 
achieved. 
  35 
Following surgical closure, the surgical field is cleaned and an appropriate dressing 
is applied to the surgical wound and drains are stitched into place as necessary; if the 
patient has undergone a general anaesthetic for surgery, the patient will be awoken from 
anaesthesia and breathing tubes and the ventilator will be removed.  The patient then 
needs to be transferred from the surgical table to a stretcher for transfer to the post-
anaesthetic recovery room.  This process, depending on the complexity of the life support 
medications and systems associated can be time consuming and dangerous and has in 
itself been described from an operations management perspective (Naik, 2006).  
Following the transfer of the patient from the operating room by the anaesthesiologist, the 
equipment used in the last surgery are collected and sent for cleaning in the sterilization 
and processing department of the hospital.  Dedicated cleaning staff is then responsible 
for a complete sterilization of reusable equipment (monitors, tables, lights, etc) and 
replacement and restocking of supplies and medication inside the operating room.  While 
the room is being processed, the anaesthesiologist will have ensured the safe transfer of 
care to the recovery room staff and will then proceed to assessment and preparation of the 
next patient.  This may involve a history, a physical examination, and potentially 
premedication or placement of a regional anaesthetic technique.  Simultaneously, the 
nursing staff is responsible for unpacking and preparing surgical equipment for the next 
case and then bringing the patient from the preoperative area to the operating room.  A 
preoperative checklist is increasingly becoming a necessary component of this process 
and has recently become a mandate of the World Health Organization (World Health 
Organization, 2009). 
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Upon entering the operating room, the anaesthesiologist will decide if any 
specialized monitoring or pain control techniques will be employed during the case.  
These procedures, including the placement of invasive blood pressure monitors, epidural 
catheters, or electroencephalogram electrodes may be time consuming and may vary from 
case to case.  These procedures are followed by the induction of anaesthesia and 
positioning of the patient; positioning is another time-consuming and potentially 
dangerous step especially when positioning includes flipping the asleep patient into a 
prone position or other positions necessitated by the surgical procedure.  Finally, the 
patient is prepped and draped and the final surgical time-out is often performed at this 
time. 
Internal set-up includes activities that can only be performed while the process is 
halted.  These activities include the sterilization and cleaning of the operating table and 
floor, the unpacking of supplies for the second case and the transfer of the patient to the 
recovery room; clearly none of these activities can be performed in the midst of the 
surgical procedure.  However, some activities can be and should be external, that is, they 
can be performed while the process is active.  Shifting internal activities into external 
activities reduces the downtime of the system (Leslie, Hagood, Royer, Reece Jr, & 
Maloney, 2006).  Such activities include restocking of anaesthetic drugs, or surgical 
supplies such as sutures, having the next patient assessed in advance by a nurse or 
another anaesthesiologist so that these activities do not need to occur in the turnover 
period. 
In an early study, Mazzei determined that at his university hospital, skin incision 
was occurring between 21 and 49 minutes after the scheduled start time for the first 
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surgery of the day (Mazzei, 1994).  In this study, the author attempted to differentiate 
room turnover and patient turnover.  Room turnover is the time from patient out to next 
patient in, and patient turnover is the time from end of surgery to the induction of the next 
patient; this is illustrated in Figure 2.4: 
Figure 2.4:  Surgical and turnover times  
07:10
OR Start and Setup
07:25
Patient enters room 
Anaesthesia induction begins
07:40
Induction complete
Skin incision
07:40 - 09:45
Surgical Skin to Skin Time
09:45
Skin closure
10:00
Patient awakens 
Exits OR
Cleaning begins
10:15
Cleaning complete
OR Setup begins
10:30
Patient enters OR
10:45
Anaesthetic induction complete
09:45 - 10:45
Patient Turnover Time
10:30
Patient enters OR
10:00 - 10:30
Room Turnover Time
10:15
Cleaning complete
OR Setup begins
07:25
Patient enters room 
Anaesthesia induction begins
09:45
Skin closure
07:40
Induction complete
Skin incision
07:40 - 09:45
Surgical Skin to Skin Time
10:00
Patient awakens 
Exits OR
Cleaning begins
07:10
OR Start and Setup
10:45
Anaesthetic induction complete
 
The room turnover time was almost uniformly 36 minutes while the patient 
turnover time was highly variable but generally one hour.  It can be expected that cases 
with greater complexity or critically-ill patients may incur longer patient turnover time 
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because this measure includes the anaesthesia component of surgical care and the 
inherent clinical variability that exists in medicine. 
Attempts to decrease turnover time have been well documented in the 
anaesthesiology, surgical, and operations management literature (Mazzei, 1994), 
(Leibovitz, 2003).  The Vancouver General Hospital initiative to standardize the 
turnaround time will be discussed further in the following chapter. 
2.5.3 Accurate OR booking times 
By far the greatest degree of variability in attempting to adhere to the scheduled 
elective slate of surgery arises from actual surgical times that differ from the expected 
surgical time.  In both the block and open scheduling system, surgeons book procedures 
and attach a predicted surgical time to each procedure.  The allocated block of time can 
be filled with whatever combination of surgeries that the individual surgeon, or a group 
of surgeons, chooses to combine provided that the surgical times do not exceed the 
available number of hours.  A number of different means can be used to project surgical 
times.   
One system is to have surgeons predict operative times individually for each 
individual patient.  This will take into account both surgeon factors and patient factors 
which may shorten or lengthen the expected duration.  However, it has been 
demonstrated that surgeons are generally optimistic about their projections and that 
schedule overruns and cancellations are frequent when surgeons attempt to book the list 
themselves (Pandit & Carey, 2006).   In one study, Pandit demonstrated that when asked 
to book a surgical list, surgeons over ran the scheduled time 50% of the time, and 34% of 
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lists suffered a cancellation. This author suggests that while surgeon’s predictions should 
be used in scheduling, they should not be responsible for assembling the schedule.   
One factor may be confusion about the terminology.  It has already been shown that 
no standard definition of turnaround time is widely accepted.  The same lack of 
standardization plagues the definition of surgical time as well.  When predicting a 
surgical time, some surgeon may include the anaesthesia time (setup and induction) as 
well as the time for waking the patient up or applying dressings and bandages.  Other 
surgeons will submit their prediction as simply skin-to-skin time and not include any of 
the ancillary activities. 
An alternative system is to track each surgeon’s historical surgical times for each 
procedure and book future schedules based on individual averages.  Of course, this 
system cannot account for patient variability; often the complexity and therefore duration 
of surgery cannot be judged until after the opening incision is made.  If operative times 
are simply based on historical averages, the surgeon is unable to tailor scheduling 
requests to reflect a predicted difficult case.  By taking historical averages, provided the 
surgeon has performed a sufficient volume of cases, the expectation is that some cases 
will run long and some will run short but that on the average, extremes will be offset. 
The broadest means by which to schedule duration is by using historical averages 
for each type of surgery across a pool of surgeons.  For example, a laparoscopic 
gallbladder removal on average is a 45 minute procedure, a clipping of a single cerebral 
aneurysm averages 3.5 hours, or a multi-level spinal fixation with rods averages 6 hours.  
Again, individual patient factor variations are not accounted for and now surgeon 
differences are unaccounted.  This system of predicting future surgical times has been 
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found to be ineffective in scheduling cases to finish on time (Zhou, Dexter, Macario, & 
Lubarsky, 1999).  Difficulty arises in predicting surgical duration in teaching institutions 
where resident surgeons are involved in performing surgical procedures.  Junior surgical 
residents are granted gradually increasing responsibility in surgery based on proven 
performance but a learning curve is expected and throughput is slower when junior 
trainees are involved.   
Clearly, no single system can account for all degrees of variation; a combination of 
historical times and surgeon customization may be the solution that provides the most 
accurate picture.  This system would allow the surgeon, when booking a case, to select 
the procedure from a list of his commonly performed procedures; attached to each 
procedure would be a mean length of time calculated from historical data on cases that 
that particular surgeon had already performed.  Prior to confirming the procedure and the 
associated length of time, the surgeon would have the option of increasing or decreasing 
the booking time based on their impression of factors specific to that patient.  For 
example, a surgeon may average 3.0 hours for clipping a single cerebral aneurysm but 
believes, based on the location of a particular aneurysm as seen on CT scanning, that the 
dissection will be more challenging than usual and will therefore add 30 minutes to the 
booking time.  By having the system generate a mean time first and then allowing 
customization afterwards, there is an anchoring effect that prevents overly optimistic or 
aggressive booking of the schedule and perhaps avoiding overruns.  
2.5.4 Dedicated emergency rooms 
In a tertiary referral hospital or large academic institution, the emergency operating 
room is available 24 hours a day to handle urgent procedures.  The demand for 
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emergency surgery is weighted heavily towards particular surgical services with general 
surgery and orthopaedic trauma surgery as the highest users of the emergency operating 
room.  It has been recognized that while still emergent, many orthopaedic injuries that 
require repair such as hip fractures, or removal of infected orthopaedic hardware, can be 
medically stabilized for a period of time prior to requiring surgery.  As a result, many 
centres have developed dedicated resources for orthopaedic trauma and other services 
(plastic surgery, ophthalmology, gynaecology) to deal with emergency cases that have 
arisen over the previous 24 hours but that can be handled during daytime hours.  These 
resources are deemed “protected time” for each individual service and can be booked by 
surgeons on that particular service on an open booking system.  
Evidence suggests that for those orthopaedic injuries that can wait until the next 
day, there may be numerous benefits in waiting (Lemos, et al., 2009).  From a patient 
safety perspective, a group from MGH noted that for hip fracture surgery and femoral 
nailing, surgery performed at night had a significantly higher incidence of surgical 
complication than when performed in the daytime, a result that can be attributable to 
surgeon fatigue and fewer ancillary support services (Bhattacharyya, et al., 2006).  In 
terms of utilization, the shift from overnight surgery to next day surgery resulted in a 6% 
reduction in over-utilization.  The additional benefit is in recruitment and retaining of 
surgeons; a facility that offers the opportunity to perform emergency surgery during the 
day rather than at night is more attractive for surgeons. 
2.5.5 Hybrid block and open booking 
Hybrid scheduling is a technique that incorporates the benefits of both the block 
scheduling method and the open scheduling method.  Effectively, a portion of the 
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operating rooms are dedicated to specific surgical services and continue to be booked as 
block time while another portion of the operating rooms function with an open booking 
system.  Surgical services that have regular demand for operating time would benefit 
from securing block time while others services that do not have a regular input of surgical 
demand would only schedule into the open room.  Surgical services in the latter category 
include the burn surgery and trauma surgery services.   
While the hybrid model appears to provide substantial advantage over a pure block 
or open system, it is not widely used (Kindscher & Rockford, 2009).  One likely 
explanation for this is that each surgical service is self-interested in preserving their 
operating room time and a loss of block allocation results in competition for scarce room 
availability.  
Operations management provides a framework for describing OR processes and 
suggests steps in the processes that require improvement. Two tools in particular that are 
highly relevant to the operating room are queuing theory and Lean management.  
Strategies that incorporate these tools may offer meaningful benefits in terms of 
efficiency and improved utilization of resources   Moreover, operations management 
provides performance indicators on which hospitals can be reasonably compared to one 
another.   
The ease of application of these techniques will likely vary from institution to 
institution and depend heavily on local factors including culture and complexity.  An 
example of how some of these strategies were implemented at a large tertiary hospital 
may provide insight into potential challenges as well as the extent of potential 
improvements.  
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3: The Vancouver General Hospital Experience 
Many of the operations management techniques discussed can be illustrated by the 
real world experience of the Vancouver General Hospital.  Over the preceding 18 
months, this large institution has begun to address several flaws in its operations.  Some 
of the challenges faced by managers at this institution may serve to guide other centres in 
addressing similar process re-design. 
In particular, the Vancouver Hospital (1) introduced a flex operating room, distinct 
from the existing emergency operating room that helped to reduce the queue of patients 
awaiting emergency surgery, (2) formalized a policy for starting the first case of the day 
on time, (3) standardized turnaround time, and (4) is attempting to implement a more 
precise scheduling system. 
3.1 Vancouver Hospital Background 
The Vancouver Acute Hospital is the major tertiary referral centre of the Coastal 
Health Authority of British Columbia.  It is the largest of the academic teaching hospitals 
fully affiliated with the medical school of the University of British Columbia.  The 
Vancouver Acute (VA) site, formally known as the Vancouver General Hospital (VGH) 
has 955 fully accredited inpatient beds and is the second largest hospital in Canada.  The 
annual volume of patients seen in the emergency department is approximately 66,000 per 
year.  The health authority is responsible for administering services to over one million 
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people on the South coast of British Columbia and operates on a budget of approximately 
$2.8 billion. 
Surgery is performed at two sites; there are 19 operating rooms in the main 
operating suite in the Jimmy Pattison (JP) pavilion of the Vancouver Acute (VA) site and 
another 8 operating rooms at the UBC Hospital site.  The UBCH is a lower acuity 
hospital where elective day-care
1
 surgery is performed on outpatients and elective 
surgery is performed on generally healthier inpatients.  The UBCH does not perform 
emergency surgery and patients admitted through the emergency department requiring 
emergency surgery are transferred to the main VA site.  In addition to the 19 main 
operating rooms, surgical staffs (anaesthesiologists, nurses, and surgeons) are distributed 
to other remote sites including the interventional radiology suite, interventional 
cardiology, and the lithotripsy suite.  Review of operations for 2007 revealed that more 
than 16,000 scheduled surgical procedures were being performed during surgical 
primetime (0700h to 1930h) each year.  Approximately 8,000 emergency procedures are 
also performed yearly at the VA site.    
The scope of surgeries performed at the Vancouver General Hospital includes 
comprehensive general and trauma surgery, cardiac, thoracic, gynaecological, 
orthopaedic (trauma and reconstructive), ophthalmologic, urologic, ENT, plastic, 
vascular and neurosurgical procedures.  No paediatric or obstetrical care is provided at 
the VGH; dedicated regional centres provide these services in the vicinity.  The site is 
also the provincial centre for lung, liver and kidney transplantation.  
                                                   
1
 Day-care surgery refers to surgery performed on outpatients that do not require admission overnight to 
hospital.  Typically patients are healthy and procedures are routine. 
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3.2 Vancouver Hospital description of the problem 
 
At the start of 2008, it was recognized that the VA site was failing to meet critical 
benchmarks for the performance of emergency surgeries.  In particular, two shortcomings 
were recognized.  First, surgeries booked by surgeons as priority 3 (ideally done within 
24 hours but must be done within 48 hours) were not being done in less than 48 hours and 
on occasion were not being completed for three or four days after the initial booking; 
similarly alarming, a large number of surgeries scheduled as less than 8 hours (priority 2) 
were not being performed within that time frame either. Figure 3.1 demonstrates the 
failure to complete emergency surgeries within the delineated time requirements.  
Figure 3.1:  Failure to meet emergency surgery time requirements (Third Quarter 2007)  
 
 
 
  
67%
87%
Emergency surgery performed within required time
Priority 3 (< 24 - 48 Hours) Priority 2 (< 8 Hours)
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At VGH, a designation of less than 8 hours (Priority 2) means that surgery is 
required within that time window in order to save life, limb or organ.  Failure to achieve 
these targets suggests that patient safety was being jeopardized in the delay.  Recalling 
the process map discussed earlier, the result of prolonged waits of three to four days for 
priority 3 and 4 cases was that patients were often occupying inpatient medical and 
surgical beds which in turn hindered the flow of patients from the emergency department 
(ED) to hospital wards, backing up the ED, and producing long waits for paramedics to 
drop off patients or forcing the diversion of ambulances to other hospitals.   
The second major failure recognized was the high number of cancellations of 
elective surgeries on the day of scheduled surgery because of time overruns (diversions 
from the scheduled slate) and the need to accommodate emergency procedures.  
Cancellation of surgery has ramifications on all stakeholders (patients, physicians, the 
hospital facility and administration, and the government payer).  Patients clearly suffer 
from cancellation; patients are instructed to fast from midnight preceding the morning of 
surgery and because the surgery that is most likely cancelled due to overrun of the 
schedule is the last surgery of the day, cancelled patients may have fasted up to 15 hours 
before being informed of the cancellation.  Furthermore, VA being a tertiary referral 
hospital where complex surgeries are performed, many surgical patients travel from 
distant regions of British Columbia and when cancelled, are inconvenienced in having to 
reschedule their travel or place an extra cost onto the health authority if they are admitted 
to hospital until the surgery can take place.  These physical inconveniences are minor in 
comparison to the emotional stress of anticipation resulting from the unexpectedly 
prolonged wait.   
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Surgeons are inconvenienced in having to clear up surgical time in their elective 
slates.  In most cases, surgeons at VA are granted only one day of elective operating 
room time a week; clearly, reorganizing their elective slates poses a challenge.  This 
challenge is reflected in lengthy wait-times for particular surgeons and surgeries.  Finally, 
schedule overruns short of case cancellation force overtime on the surgical staff, most 
notably the operating room nurses. While overtime is paid at a premium in this health 
system, perpetual demands of overtime on nursing staff had led to diminished morale in 
the department and alarming attrition and the inability to attract new staff.  The operating 
room management had already acknowledged that the state of overtime was not 
sustainable for the staff; further, overtime wages were a significant strain on the operating 
room departmental budget (personal communication, June 22, 2009) which threatened the 
closure of entire operating rooms. 
Operating room managers and medical directors recognized that in order to achieve 
appropriate benchmarks on timely completion, maximize utilization within a given 
budget, and maintain employee morale, various steps within the operating room process 
required revision.  The areas specifically identified and targeted were those previously 
discussed: standardizing turnaround time, emphasizing and enforcing on-time starts, and 
initiating accurate surgical booking times.  All of these were overseen by a newly created 
non-medical, managerial position of slate expediter.  While not explicitly intentioned to 
conform to any framework, the steps taken in addressing system failures and attempts to 
improve flow can be well described in terms of Lean management and queuing theory.  
The resulting improvements in reduction of schedule overruns and increased achievement 
of emergency time targets (described in a later section) can be emulated in other centres 
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through the implementation of queuing strategies that reduce variability and increase 
processing channels, and Lean strategies that minimize non-value added steps in the 
process. 
3.2.1 The Sweeper Room reduces the queue, improves bottleneck 
The operating suite
2
 of the VGH, when represented as a service process has two 
distinct components.  There is the elective scheduled component and the emergency 
component; while they can be considered separately and running in parallel, there is some 
overlap.  Figure 3.2 depicts the “as-is” parallel elective and emergency processes.  
                                                   
2
 The operating suite refers to the collection of operating rooms including the ancillary activities 
(preoperative assessment, post anaesthetic recovery, etc) 
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Figure 3.2:  VGH JPOR elective and emergency surgery as-is process 
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 Emergency surgeries that cannot be performed overnight are carried forward to the 
next morning wherein more emergency cases are continually added.  Emergency cases 
may infringe on the elective schedule during the day if a stat priority 1 case presents and 
the emergency room is already occupied for an extended period of time.  The emergency 
case would bump into the elective slate and force delay or cancellation.  
The queuing problem arises at night because of the limited resources available 
overnight and the unpredictable demand placed on those resources by emergency 
admissions.  While up to three operating rooms can run simultaneously overnight, the 
demand placed on nursing and anaesthesiology resources is not sustainable from a 
workload or morale perspective; on most nights, one operating room is in operation after 
2300h 
Most surgical specialties are represented at the hospital with the exception of 
paediatric and obstetrical surgery.  Obstetrical surgery (emergency Caesarean-section, 
and post-partum bleeding) was eliminated from the Vancouver Acute site twenty years 
ago because of the additional demand it placed on surgical services overnight; obstetrical 
services for much of the city of Vancouver were consolidated at the British Columbia 
Women`s Hospital following the closure and amalgamation of a number of smaller 
facilities.   Even without emergency C-sections, the variability of demand is high; the 
most frequent emergency surgeries performed are repairs of orthopaedic injury including 
hip and long bone fractures and spine instability, laparotomy for general surgery, 
stabilization of multi-trauma, neurosurgery, and vascular surgery for limb salvage.  While 
seasonal variation exists (summer months are associated with a greater incidence of gun 
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violence, and winter months are associated with more fractures resulting from falls), there 
is too much uncertainty to alter resource levels overnight (having a second operating 
room open and regularly available) based on predictions of demand. 
In discussing the necessary trade-offs that exist in a queuing system, we have seen 
that there are several ways to address concerns with the formation of long queues.  These 
strategies include increasing the capacity of the system by increasing the number of 
processing channels, reducing variability or uncertainty (in length of processing, and in 
time between inputs), or by simply reducing the amount of input (the demand) by 
directing some patients to alternate facilities. 
In not meeting targets for completing emergency surgery, it was apparent that the 
queue forming each night at VGH had grown too long.  Traditionally, an open scheduling 
system has been used for emergency surgery with bookings from surgeons starting 
immediately following the elective slate in the afternoon.  The table below (Table 3.1) 
illustrates a typical slate of emergency surgeries accumulated by the afternoon and 
awaiting completion. 
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Table 3.1:  Overnight emergency bookings for the JPOR at the VGH (listed in order of booking) 
Surgery Urgency 
(Time) 
Priority Estimated 
Duration 
IM Nailing of a hip fracture < 24 – 48 3 1.5 
Appendectomy for appendicitis < 8 2 1.5 
Craniotomy for intracranial haemorrhage <1 1 2.0 
Abdominal washout for sepsis < 8 2 2.0 
Laparotomy and bowel resection for ischemic bowel < 8 2 2.5 
Tracheostomy < 24 3 1.5 
Open reduction and internal fixation humeral fracture < 24 3 2.0 
Open reduction and internal fixation femoral mid-shaft 
fracture 
< 24 3 2.0 
Laparotomy for massive bleeding due to gunshot 
wound 
< 1 1 2.5 
  Total: 17.5 Hrs 
 
 Cases would be done on a first-in, first-out system based first on prioritization 
level.  Patients requiring immediate surgery (priority 1) were operated on first; surgeons 
would on occasion ask to bump other surgeons in the queue if they felt that their patient 
required more urgent care.  Urgent cases could be performed in multiple ORs in the 
afternoon because of the availability of anaesthesiologists and nurses until 1900h; after 
1900h however, only one anaesthesiologist and one team of operating room nurses are 
typically on site.   
After 1900h and throughout the night, inputs to the queue continue but the service 
is reduced to one channel.  A second operating room can be opened up (by calling in an 
anaesthesiologist and a team of nurses) for stat surgery if the team present is already 
occupied and unavailable in a timely manner; but this comes at significant increased cost 
(Tucker, Barone, Cecere, Blabey, & Rha, 1999).  Increasing capacity, by calling in the 
second team, is only available for true stat surgery such as trauma, craniotomy, or 
transplant and cannot be made available every night for less urgent emergency cases (less 
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than 8, or less than 24-48).  The result is that while stat surgery requirements are met, less 
urgent emergency cases may need to be delayed until the operating room becomes 
available; and prioritization of other more urgent surgeries in front of waiting procedures 
can produce an extensive backlog of cases designated as priority 2 or 3.  The as-is 
process is mapped in Figure 3.2. 
In order to deal with emergency cases that were accumulating overnight or over 
several nights, the VGH initiated the Sweeper (Urgent/Flex) Room.  Conceptualized as a 
resource rather than a physical room, the Sweeper Room is essentially an 
anaesthesiologist and a team of operating room nurses available from 0700h to 1700h 
that is tasked with sweeping up cases that remained from the night before but that were 
not booked into the original emergency operating room that runs 24 hours.  These were 
primarily priority 3 or 4 cases that in the block scheduling system were difficult to 
schedule and often were delayed several days.  In relating the effect of the Sweeper 
Room to the framework of a queuing system, the Sweeper Room produces three results: 
 Decreases variability 
 Increases the number of queues 
 Increases the processing channels 
In order to fund the Sweeper Room in the trial period (third and fourth quarters of 
2008), elective surgical time was clawed back from all surgical services.  This resulted in 
an estimated reduction of 350 elective scheduled cases per year, which represents a 2% 
reduction in elective procedures.  Additional funding has subsequently been obtained to 
restore the entire cancer surgery portion of the previously reduced services.  The majority 
of surgeons were supportive of the new initiative, despite a small reduction in elective 
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time, because of the opportunity to improve emergency surgery performance.  
Furthermore, the reduction of elective cases scheduled did not exceed the number of 
forced cancellations that were previously occurring because of schedule overruns. 
3.2.1.1 Decreased variability 
In making available additional dedicated operating room time in the daytime, lower 
priority emergency cases that were previously booked into the open emergency room 
could be electively postponed until the next day.  A large number of surgeries and in fact, 
entire types of surgery could be shifted to the daytime without impeding the availability 
of the high priority emergency OR; this includes the majority of orthopaedic trauma 
surgeries, plastic surgery procedures and stable gynaecological procedures.  The 
reduction in the variety of surgeries-in both emergency channels-is beneficial in 
minimizing the queue because estimates of duration could be more precise and a smaller 
range of equipment or resources would be needed and could be close by, reducing 
turnaround time; moreover, nursing staff would face fewer types of surgeries, avoiding 
some procedures that required specialized experience or expertise.  This allows for more 
rapid set-ups and smoother performance. 
3.2.1.2 Increased number of queues 
In effect, diverting priority 3, 4 and some priority 2 cases until 0700h produced two 
distinct queues where previously there was only one.  With the Sweeper Room (also 
referred to as the Flex Room), one queue would form for the low priority urgent cases, 
and a second queue would be formed for priority 1 and 2 cases.  
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Prior to the Sweeper Room, the VGH had already implemented a number of 
protected operating rooms.  Protected ORs or protected time refers to dedicated operating 
room time and facilities granted to a surgical service to book openly.  The combination of 
open scheduling and the more common block scheduling is the hybrid system previously 
discussed.  Many surgeries previously performed at night, including hip fractures, wrist 
fractures and other orthopaedic procedures, had already been shifted to the orthopaedic 
trauma protected time in the daytime.  This model of care has been demonstrated to 
improve outcomes because of a reduction in surgical complications arising from surgeon 
fatigue and other factors (Lemos, et al., 2009). 
The Sweeper Room works in a similar way to divert cases from the emergency 
slate to an openly booked room but rather than being protected for a single surgical 
service, all services would have access to these resources. 
3.2.1.3 Increase number of processing channels 
The flexibility of the Sweeper Room allows for increased processing of all 
emergency surgeries because it increases the capacity of the system.  It acts as increased 
surge capacity for the unpredictable demand of emergencies.  During the daytime hours 
(0700h to 1900h) low urgency surgeries can be performed in the flex space preventing 
long delays for these procedures while the emergency room can be utilized for higher 
priority or stat cases.  When needed though, it also provides increased capacity for high 
priority cases should multiple priority 1 or 2 cases present and need to be performed 
simultaneously. 
This system is different than simply increasing emergency room capacity by 
doubling the number of emergency operating rooms.  While the mandate of the Sweeper 
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Room is to ensure that all true emergencies (priority 1 and 2) are performed in a timely 
way, it is not commonly utilized to perform these cases itself, although it can.  Instead, it 
acts to relieve the congestion on the bottleneck room by diverting cases that would 
normally be done in that room (priority 3 and 4) and processes them through a secondary 
channel.  Conversely, if two operating rooms were dedicated to performing urgent 
priority 1 and 2 procedures, low priority procedures would continue to be heavily 
delayed. 
Depicted graphically, the process map for the new process appears in Figure 3.3 
below.  Perhaps the most beneficial secondary effect of the Sweeper Room was the 
increased ability to address priority 4 urgent elective cases.  These cases were often 
complicated surgical problems that required the coordination of multiple surgical services 
such as the combined efforts of vascular, general, orthopaedic and plastic at the same 
time.  These cases were traditionally difficult to schedule in the block or protected time 
system because no individual service was willing to allocate its dedicated resources to a 
combined procedure.  The result was often lengthy delays and prolonged hospital 
admissions occupying resources while awaiting an opening in the emergency room 
(personal communication, June 30, 2009).  The Sweeper Room was clearly ideal to 
address this demand because of its open scheduling system and availability to all surgical 
services. 
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Figure 3.3:  VGH Operating Room process with the addition of the Sweeper Room.  
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3.2.2 Implementing on-time starts and standard turnarounds 
Several factors leading to the need to cancel elective surgeries were identified.  
Two were determined to be easily targeted for correction, on-time starts and reducing the 
time required to turn-around operating rooms between cases.  These two steps in the 
service process are clearly non-value added and contribute to waiting times and decrease 
throughput through cancellation and reduction of utilization. 
3.2.2.1 First Case Start Time 
The Vancouver Acute hospital implemented the First Case Start Time (FCST) 
policy in 2008.  By observation, several of the 19 regular operating rooms were routinely 
starting the morning case five or more minutes after the scheduled start time of 0725h.  
According to the slate expediter charged with monitoring late starts, the most regularly 
cited surgical subspecialties failing to start on-time were the general surgery and 
gynaecology operating rooms (personal communication, June 30, 2009). 
The development of a culture amongst the personnel was identified as the key 
contributor to the recurrent late starts.  Set-up of the surgical instruments and the layout 
of the room is intended to begin at 0710h when the team of operating nurses arrive.  The 
necessary equipment for the elective schedule of surgeries would have already been 
delivered the night before from the sterile processing department and are packaged inside 
the operating suite core, ready to be individually unpacked for each scheduled surgery 
that day.  The nursing staff is responsible for unpacking the equipment, setting up the 
room appropriately for the given procedure and then retrieving the patient from the 
preoperative holding area such that the patient enters the room at 0725h for induction of 
anaesthesia. 
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Observations by the nursing staff and physicians suggested where delays were 
arising.  These included, short staffing as a result of “sick-calls”, prolonged in-services or 
morning huddles that extended into the 0710h set-up time, being pre-occupied setting up 
the OR and neglecting to check-in and pick up the patient on time, and the patient not 
being ready because the surgeon had not marked the surgical site; most clearly however, 
surgical teams that were guilty of starting late on a regular basis, simply worked slower 
with a sense of lower urgency.  A culture of tardiness and a cycle of complacency had 
been established. 
In order to address these deep cultural behaviours, the FCST policy was 
implemented.  Motivation and buy-in can be difficult when implementing significant 
change, especially when demanding an increase in productivity.  In the case of the VA 
experience, motivation would need to come from both intrinsic reward as well as 
extrinsic penalty.  Nursing staff were involved in the process of developing the FCST as 
it has been recognized that input from front-line workers is key to buy-in and success of 
the project (Noon, Schiffer, & Crane, 2009).  Nurses were able to voice their complaints 
about delays stemming from the preoperative holding area, and physicians complained 
about nurses waiting too long before retrieving the patient.  The final motivation for 
improvement was the strict implementation of a case cancellation policy.  The policy 
states that if the final scheduled case of the day in an individual operating room is 
expected to start one hour or more after the scheduled time, then it will be cancelled.  
This became a strong motivator for surgeons to start on-time and to encourage the 
nursing staff to adhere to start times and rapid turnover. 
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Changes were made in order to better align practices in the preoperative area with 
the goal of on-time starts.  These changes included allowing anaesthesiologists to mark 
the surgical site in advance or in lieu of the surgeon if a regional anaesthesia technique 
was to be used, having more patients seen by an anaesthesiologist in the preadmission 
clinic in order to cut down time for assessment on the morning of surgery, and having 
operating room nurses complete a portion of the pre-surgical checklist in the preoperative 
holding area.   
In order to motivate individual stakeholders further, a record of the arrival time of 
nurses, surgeons and anaesthesiologists was kept by the slate expediter.  Regular 
tardiness would need to be explained in person to the slate expediter and formal letters 
were sent to surgeons whose operating rooms regularly started late. 
3.2.2.2 Turnaround Time 
The time required to clean and re-prepare the operating room between the exit of a 
patient until the entrance of the next patient has been termed the turnover time or the 
turnaround time (TAT) at the Vancouver Acute hospital.  Several activities must occur in 
order for a room to turnaround between cases and these activities involve numerous 
groups of individuals.  At the VGH, these activities include:  
1) the anaesthesiologist must take the postoperative patient to the recovery 
room and ensure stability then transfer care to the RN; the 
anaesthesiologist must then proceed to the see the next patient in the 
preoperative area, and then return to the OR where he must prepare the 
anaesthetic for the upcoming case;  
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2) the OR nurses must count every item of surgical equipment used in the 
surgery, safely handle and repack surgical supplies from the first case so 
that they can be processed in sterile processing, and complete 
documentation and then following cleaning of the OR, nurses must unpack 
equipment and lay-out the room for the next procedure, and then check-in 
the next patient; 
3) cleaning staff enter the room immediately after the patient has exited the 
room and perform a thorough cleaning and sanitization of the floors, 
machinery and equipment, and surgical table; perioperative assistants 
(PAs) replace supplies consumed in the earlier cases and assemble and 
position equipment with the guidance of the nurses and surgeons; 
4) the surgeon and surgical team must dictate the events of the previous 
surgery, see the next patient.  While not directly affecting turnaround, 
surgeons will often leave the operating suite to address other pressing 
issues in the hospital including consultations and assessments on the ward 
or in the emergency room.  As well, surgeons and their teams often take 
the opportunity during turnaround periods to eat.  The immediate 
availability of the surgical team does impact the ability of the OR to 
proceed to the next case if the surgeon has not seen the patient and marked 
the surgical site. 
Prior to the TAT policy, no formal guidelines for these tasks were delineated and 
this turnaround period varied in length.  The target of the TAT policy (appendix) was to 
have all turnarounds completed within 30 minutes.  A reduction in TAT, equivalent to the 
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concept of minimizing set-up time in the Lean/JIT framework reduces overall throughput 
time and allows for more cases to be performed or prevents cancellations.  When applied 
to the 24 hour a day emergency operating room, a mean reduction of turnaround time (or 
set-up time, in the Lean philosophy) of 10 minutes when applied over the course of 60 
cases (an average weekly emergency case load) translates into almost ten hours of 
additional operating room availability. 
In order to achieve this goal, the policy outlined several steps that should be taken 
in order to convert many of the set-up activities from internal to external set-up (Slack, 
Chambers, & Johnston, 2007) or to improve efficiency through parallel processing 
(Harders, Malangoni, Weight, & Sidhu, 2006), (Friedman, Sokal, Chang, & Berger, 
2006); a number of them are listed here:   
 At VGH, resident anaesthesiologists or surgeons can be dispatched to the 
preoperative holding area to assess upcoming patients prior to the completion 
of the first case in order to save time during turnaround periods.   
 A policy was implemented that allowed the anaesthesiologist to mark the site 
of surgery thus relieving the surgeon of this responsibility in case they were 
still occupied in the previous case.   
 Communication between the operating room and the preoperative care area 
made it possible to have patients ready 30 minutes in advance of the next case 
even if the slate was running ahead of schedule.   
 The anaesthesiologist would communicate to the recovery room prior to the 
completion of surgery that special equipment such as a ventilator would be 
required and set-up so as to prevent delays at the end of the case. 
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 Anaesthesiologists and surgeons were made to understand that the turnaround 
period was not a “break-period” and that all staff should be immediately 
available within the turnaround time. 
 Cleaning staff and PAs were organized into teams with each team responsible 
for only 6 operating rooms, all located in the same area of the operating suite 
in order to minimize unnecessary movement of staff 
 Visual displays outside of rooms would alert cleaning staff of surgeries that 
were nearing completion so that teams of cleaners would be immediately 
ready to commence cleaning.  
 
3.2.3 Predictive Scheduling: the X-Time initiative 
Of the steps in the value chain, the step with the greatest degree of variation in 
length is the actual surgical time.  It is well understood that different surgeries will 
require different lengths of time and so allotment is made in the elective schedule for this.  
For example a complicated resection for pancreatic cancer requires upwards of 4 hours 
while a laparoscopic cholecystectomy for gallstones requires one hour.  There are several 
ways in which block time can be allocated in order to achieve different levels of high 
utilization including longest to shortest and others (Dexter & Epstein, 2003), (Dexter, 
2006) (Dexter & Traub, 2002).  At the VA hospital, surgical specialties schedule their 
own block time such that the aggregate lengths of the surgeries planned and the necessary 
turnaround times in between procedures fits within the allocation of the block.  The 
problem that became clear in discussion with surgeons was that there was no 
standardization of the estimates of surgical times and moreover, and perhaps more 
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fundamentally, there was no standard definition of what activities surgeons were 
factoring into their estimates of surgical time.  Some surgeons were estimating their skin-
to-skin time while just as many were estimating the patient-in to patient-out time.  
Clearly, as we have already discussed, differences in definition will significantly alter 
scheduling. 
Several attempts had previously been made to control this variation including using 
the surgical times generated from the Operating Room Management Information System 
(ORMIS).  This system fails to recognize significant surgeon to surgeon differences as 
well as patient complexities and variation.   
The VGH operating room has recently attempted to initiate a new program aimed at 
solving this scheduling problem; the program which is called Predictive Scheduling has 
three key steps.  The first step of this ongoing initiative has been to establish clear 
definitions.  The second step has been to measure and account for the non-surgical 
variation and attempt to standardize it; and the final challenge has been to obtain buy-in 
from the surgeons and anaesthesiologists. 
3.2.3.1 Defining X-Time 
Historically, operating room booking has been done by patient-in to patient-out 
times; this time includes surgical time as well as preparatory time by the 
anaesthesiologist, and occasionally other allied services like neurology, radiology, or 
perfusion services.  In some complicated surgeries or when in high-risk patients where 
epidural catheters or invasive monitors need to be placed in the patient, or the patient 
needs to be positioned in the prone position, this preparatory time can be substantial (30 
to 90 minutes or rarely more).  In many instances surgeons are unaware of the extent or 
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magnitude of this preparatory work and therefore cannot accurately predict its duration.  
It is much more practical to have the surgeon project only his component of the booking 
time, that is, the skin-to-skin time.  The remainder of the time has been uniquely termed 
at the VA as the X-Time. 
 Patient In to Patient Out time = A 
 Skin-to-Skin time = B 
 A – B = X Time 
 
The X-Time is comprised mostly of anaesthesia related activities prior to skin 
incision including establishing intravenous access, placement of monitors and invasive 
access monitors, epidural catheters or regional anesthetic blocks, and positioning the 
patient; and, activities after skin closure including application of dressings and casts, 
awakening the patient from anaesthesia, and transfer of patients from the surgical table to 
the stretcher or bed. 
3.2.3.2 Variations in X-Time 
Times of patient entry to the OR, skin incision time, closure time and patient exit 
were recorded for over ten thousand elective procedures performed in a six month period 
in 2008.  Procedures were classified by procedure code such that approximately 800 
unique procedures were identified.  For each unique procedure code, a mean X-Time and 
standard deviation were calculated; and groups of similar X-Times were placed together 
in groups called “buckets”.  Targets for each bucket were also assigned; these were 
termed “Olympic bucket times.”  Appendix D shows a list of representative calculations. 
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An observation was made that for each unique type of procedure, X-Times were 
similar with only a small standard deviation in comparison to standard deviations in 
actual historic skin-to-skin time.  This suggests that X-Times have limited variability for 
a given procedure and that an expected X-Time can be assigned to each surgery which 
would be predictive of the actual X-Time.  For example, the mean X-Time for five vessel 
coronary artery bypass grafts (CABGX5) was 79.3 minutes with a standard deviation of 
14.1 minutes.  In scheduling future procedures, the X-Time can be factored into the 
booking to more accurately predict the duration of the surgery.  For this CABGX5, an X-
Time of 75 minutes would be assigned and the surgical time would be predicted 
separately.   Grouping similar X-Times together into buckets of 30 minutes, 45 minutes, 
60 minutes, or 75 minutes allows for ease of booking and as a tool for benchmarking 
performance. 
In effect, defining the X-Time and assigning each procedure to a bucket separates 
the more consistent portion of the booking time from the more highly variable surgical 
time. 
3.2.3.3 Achieving buy-in by surgeons and anaesthesiologists 
In separating the X-Time from the surgical skin-to-skin time, the predictive 
scheduling initiative removes one source of uncertainty from the equation.  Surgeons 
have in the past underestimated the time required by their anaesthesiology colleagues to 
set-up and induce anaesthesia in a complicated patient.  With this scheduling system, 
surgeons will no longer be asked to factor the anaesthesia time or the X-Time into the 
surgical booking, only the skin-to-skin surgical time.  Cases will instead be booked as: 
 Skin-to-Skin Time + X-Time + Turnaround Time = Booking Time 
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The X-Times have been shown to have only limited variability regardless of the 
anaesthesiologist involved in the case and so can therefore be applied strictly by 
historical data.  The turnaround time (TAT) is the 30 minutes required to change the 
room over as previously described. 
Surgeons would be asked to book their cases as previously discussed using a 
combination of historic performance times with alteration based on individual patient 
complexities.  The X-Time for that particular surgery would then be applied with the 
option for the anaesthesiologist seeing the patient in the preadmission clinic (one week in 
advance of the surgery) to augment the booking in 15 minute increments based on 
specific individualized concerns. 
Despite initial support, the predictive scheduling system has been difficult to 
implement because of lack of commitment from the surgeons and their offices.  While 
having been informed of the need to book only surgery skin-to-skin time, many offices 
have failed to do so and have continued to attempt to book total OR time.  In the absence 
of surgeon input, the booking system has reverted back to using ORMIS historical times 
for surgical booking.  Moreover, the leader of the predictive scheduling program, the 
Medical Director of Perioperative Services has completed his tenure and the program has 
been delayed while a replacement is sought. 
In mediating this scale of change, a champion is required.  This may be best 
achieved through a trial program that includes a limited number of surgeons and surgical 
specialties.  Success of a trial would be measured in a reduction of the number and length 
of overruns of the schedule and an absolute reduction in the number of case cancellations 
in comparison to the same period using the historic system.  Alternatively, the schedule 
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could be shadow booked with the predictive scheduling approach and a comparison could 
be made to see which system predicted more precisely and accurately the duration of the 
cases.  Convincing a small number of surgeons, especially departmental heads, to 
conform to the new system may help in further buy-in from the remainder of the 
surgeons. 
3.3 Measuring outcomes 
In the last 18 months, the Vancouver Acute hospital has attempted to make 
significant changes in order to lean its operations and to improve performance.  
Interpreting the outcome of these initiatives is uniquely challenging for the hospital 
because of the lack of appropriate benchmarks.   
The most commonly used metric for operating room efficiency is utilization.  It has 
been suggested (Accenture, 2007) that for a large tertiary or trauma hospital, raw 
utilization is targeted at between 70 and 75% in order to compromise between efficient 
use of resources and maintaining the capacity to deal with surges in demand; these 
benchmarks, however, are derived from data collected in the private hospital system in 
the United States.  In comparison, the VA utilization data suggests that raw operating 
room utilization was already 81% prior to implementation of any changes.  Factoring in 
turnaround times, utilization rises to 95%, leaving an idle time of only 5% during daytime 
hours.  This is significantly higher than utilizations seen in comparable institutions in the 
United States (Tyler, Pasquariello, & Chen, 2003). 
The reason why utilization is substantially higher at the VA and likely similar 
centres in Canada in comparison to American counterparts is likely the result of the 
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restraints of the public system in which the Vancouver General Hospital operates.  
Resources are more highly constrained in the public system such that the decision of how 
many operating rooms to open and staff is determined chiefly by the size of the budget; in 
contrast, in a private institution the driver for capacity is primarily demand.  In the private 
system, where many surgical procedures are a source of revenue generation, utilization 
can be kept artificially low in order to maintain availability for add-on cases. 
That point being taken, such a high utilization may be the reason that a large 
number of cancellations were occurring and that urgent and lower priority emergency 
surgeries were not being performed on-time.  By stretching hospital resources to optimize 
utilization, there is a trade-off with surge capacity because variables such as demand and 
duration of emergency surgeries are difficult to predict.  Comparison with similar 
Canadian institutions may suggest whether VGH is over or underutilizing its operating 
facilities.  If for example, a similar centre is able to sustain high utilization without a 
similar frequency of cancellation then causes for this difference need to be sought.  
Utilization benchmarking with American counterparts is more difficult because of the 
different treatment of surgical demand.  Utilization tends to be lower in American 
hospitals (in the 70% range) because when utilization approaches 80%, additional 
operating room facilities are opened (OR Benchmarks, 2000).  Interestingly, frequency of 
case cancellation is not measured as a key performance indicator in most benchmarking 
studies in the United States likely because of the relative infrequency of cancellation. 
3.3.1 Morbidity and Mortality 
In order to determine if improvements have actually resulted from performing more 
emergency surgeries on-time, the most important measure would be a decrease in 
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morbidity or mortality.  These are the standard measurements utilized in medicine to 
determine efficacy and quality of treatment.  Unfortunately, data to determine mortality 
would require a comprehensive review of all charts for emergency procedures and would 
require follow-up even post hospital discharge; this review has not been performed.  
Morbidity is even more difficult to measure; morbidity post-operatively is not uncommon 
due to the substantial co-morbidity that exists in the emergency surgery population and 
numerous other confounders will influence outcomes, including heart disease, respiratory 
illness, traumatic injury and many more.  Moreover, a patient that is admitted to hospital 
post-operatively is monitored and medically managed for potential complications and 
many of the potential morbidities that would have arisen from long delays are avoided by 
expert management.  However, this additional medical management may be costly for the 
medical system and minimizing the need for it is still essential. 
In the absence of reliable morbidity and mortality data from first-hand experience 
at the Vancouver Acute hospital, the appropriate surrogate performance goals are the 
timelines established for each priority level of emergency surgery.  Ideally one hundred 
percent of priority 1 cases would be performed within one hour, and one hundred percent 
of priority 3 cases would be performed within the 48 hour window.  While stat surgery 
(within one hour) was always being performed within the time required, we have already 
seen that the Vancouver Acute hospital was failing to meet the required guidelines for 
emergency surgery in over 30% of cases booked as priority 2 and approximately 15% of 
the time in priority 3.  Following implementation of the Sweeper/Flex OR, there has been 
a substantial increase in the proportion of emergency cases started within the specified 
guidelines. 
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Figure 3.4:  Improvement in timely surgery (Third Quarter 2008 over 2007) 
 
 
 
An additional benefit was that priority 4 cases which were previously difficult to 
schedule because of the high utilization of the elective slate and a back-log of emergency 
cases found a place in the Sweeper Room; this resulted in a 400% increase in the number 
of Priority 4 cases that were performed in the six month trial period ending in January of 
2009. 
3.3.2 Staff satisfaction 
One of the primary goals in reducing schedule overruns was to address growing 
dissatisfaction amongst operating room nurses and poor morale leading to attrition.  
Secondarily, surgeons are continually seeking more operating room time in order to 
address ever-increasing waitlist pressure.  Satisfaction with changes must be considered 
an essential component to long-lasting improvement. 
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Satisfaction amongst the stakeholders has yet to be measured following the 
initiatives described above.  Moving forward, feedback should be sought from nurses, 
doctors, and managers as to whether their goals are being adequately addressed.  Certain 
absolute measures may be useful as surrogates for satisfaction.  As reducing the heavy 
burden of overtime work on the nursing staff is a goal, some easily measured 
performance indicators include the number of nurses joining or leaving the operating 
room (attrition and retention rates) and the number or frequency of “sick-calls.” 
A formal measurement of satisfaction with working conditions is part of the annual 
review of performance for individual nurses and channels for voicing concerns are widely 
available. 
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4: Conclusion 
Faced with constrained resources, administrators and medical practitioners need to 
find ways to simply do more with less.  In the Canadian public healthcare system, this has 
long been a recognized challenge and evidence suggests that utilization of resources such 
as operating rooms (as well as hospital beds) is high when benchmarked with comparable 
American institutions.  Nevertheless, there may be shortcomings and even failures to 
meet clinical and evidence-based guidelines for satisfactory service in terms of best 
practices. 
In order to narrow the gap in service quality including meeting guidelines for 
emergency surgery and limiting queues for elective surgery by preventing cancellations, 
there may be opportunities found within the processes and operations that already exist in 
the system.  Lean management techniques and theories originating from the Toyota 
Production System suggest that throughput and efficiency gains can be made through the 
reduction in waste.  In the context of healthcare processes, steps in the processes that do 
not add value to the patient experience represent waste.  Waiting time is the most 
common illustration of a non-value added step that occurs frequently even in the course 
of a single surgical visit.  Other forms of waste include over-processing and excessive 
movement of the practitioners performing the tasks.  All of these areas of waste offer an 
opportunity for improvement. 
Waiting times, in addition to contributing to waste and not adding value, may result 
in poorer outcomes.   The example of the Vancouver General Hospital has been given to 
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demonstrate that process re-design can be implemented through a qualitative queuing 
theory framework in order to enhance throughput of the system.  Through diverting 
resources from the elective operating rooms and implementing a flexible operating room 
resource that decreased demand on the processing ability of the 24 hour emergency 
operating room, significant improvements were made to achieving on-time emergency 
surgery.  This is expected to result in improved surgical outcomes and may therefore 
reduce subsequent costs incurred during hospitalization and reduce long-term sequelae. 
Some general lessons can be taken from the application of the operations 
management tools discussed herein (Lean management and queuing theory frameworks).  
 There is a necessary trade-off between capacity, inventory, and variability 
 Identify and reduce areas of waste including excessive queuing 
 Identify how internalized setup activities can be externalized in order to 
minimize non-value added steps 
 Appropriate key performance indicators are required for benchmarking 
 Involve stakeholders in making changes and foster a culture of improvement 
and recognition of performance improvement 
Healthcare operations have been resistant to outside influence because of the belief 
that systems involving professional practitioners and a high degree of variability in 
patient factors could not be adequately described in traditional production or service 
terms.  It is becoming increasingly clear, however, that healthcare services must be 
optimized to meet similar goals as industrial processes including quality, described in 
terms of timely delivery of services resulting in best practice and optimal outcomes, 
maximal throughput despite variability in processing times, and maximal utilization 
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which can be achieved through reductions in non-value added activities and accurate 
scheduling of tasks.  As costs associated with the delivery of care increase because of 
demand, budgets will continue to limit our ability to deliver this care.  It is the 
responsibility of those actually delivering this care to find ways to optimize our day-to-
day operations.  Management tools such as Lean and queuing theory may be the way to 
start to address and communicate these opportunities. 
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Appendix A 
 
Excerpts taken from the Vancouver Acute Operating Room Policy: 
  
I. General Surgery 
 
Priority 1. Massive bleeding 
  Bowel obstruction with mesenteric ischemia 
  Trauma (Open / Closed) - bleeding and / or unstable 
  Peritonitis with septic shock 
  Necrotizing fasciitis 
 
Priority 2. Perforated viscous 
  Bowel obstruction 
  Trauma (Open / Closed) – less urgent bleeding/+ DPL 
  Acute appendicitis 
Incarcerated hernia 
  Ischio rectal abscess 
  Peri-diverticular abscess 
  Cholecystitis with septicemia 
  Severe systemic sepsis 
 
Priority 3. Bowel obstruction of less acute nature 
  Acute cholecystitis 
  Uncomplicated abscess 
 
III Neurosurgery 
 
Priority 1. Acutely deteriorating LOC due to:  
- intracranial mass e.g. Hematoma, tumour, abscess 
- acute hydrocephalus 
 Insertion of ICP monitor 
 Repair of compound brain wounds 
 Post op complications: bleeding, cranial decompression 
 Acute cord compression 
 Acute vascular obstruction 
 Intracranial aneurysm repair after sub-arachnoid bleed 
 
Priority 2. Acute compound skull fracture 
 Vascular procedures to prevent incipient stroke 
 
Priority 3. Closed depressed skull fracture 
 Repair CSF leak 
 Brain biopsy for infection 
 Reoperation for post-op infection 
 Stabilization of spine 
 Severe tic doloureaux 
 Acute disc syndrome 
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Priority 4. Removal of percutaneous hardware 
 
 
IV. Orthopedics 
 
Priority 1. Orthopedic injuries with ischemia, massive bleeding or neurologic compromise 
  Necrotizing fasciitis/gas gangrene 
  Acute compartment syndromes 
  Dislocated hip (traumatic) 
  Massive post-op hemorrhage 
  Dislocated hip or knee arthroplasty with neurologic or vascular compromise 
  Periprosthetic fracture with neurologic or vascular compromise 
 
Priority 2. Open fractures/fracture –dislocations/joint injuries 
  Multiple long bone fractures 
  Multiple fractures in polytrauma patients 
  Acute septic joints 
  Dislocated hip arthroplasty 
  Dislocated knee arthroplasty 
  Acutely infected hip and knee arthroplasty 
  Wound lesions, hematomas, infections after arthroplasty and/or oncology 
  Femoral shaft fracture 
  Displaced hip/talus fracture in young patients 
  Irreducible joint dislocations/fracture –dislocations 
 
Priority 3. Closed fractures 
  Amputations for tumours with severe pain, severe sepsis, or gangrene 
  Acute ligamentous and tendinous injury repairs and reconstruction 
  Redebridements and delayed wound closure 
  Delayed closures and debridement 
 
Priority 4. Locked knee 
  Impending fractures 
  Periprosthetic fractures after hip and knee arthroplasty 
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Appendix B 
Prioritization of emergency surgery protocol for VGH: 
 
Scheduling of Surgical Cases 
 
 
1. Purpose: 
 
To define standard scheduling practices and ensure accurate scheduling of surgical cases across 
all Operative Sites 
 
 
A. Elective Case: A case that can be scheduled at least two weeks prior to the 
preferred surgical date. 
B. Urgent Case: A case that must be scheduled within 48hrs.  
C. Emergency case: A case that must be scheduled within 24 hrs. 
D. OR Locations: ECC – Eye Care Center 
                             JPOR – Jim Pattison Pavilion OR’s (VGH site) 
                             UBCH – UBCH OR’s (UBC site) 
E. Block Scheduling – OR block time made available to each service and scheduled 
for a fixed time period. Each division is responsible for determining individual 
surgeon time and informing the OR booking clerk. Services must use block 
time before booking in to any other available time. 
F. If block time cannot be utilized by a service they must inform OR Booking a 
minimum of two weeks in advance. 
G. Protected OR time – Block time provided to a service to accommodate urgent 
cases. 
H. Operating room Slate – A list of scheduled surgical cases arranged according to 
site, date and OR room number 
I. Surgical case – The information provided on the slate will include:  
i. Patient name 
ii. MRN number  
iii. Account # 
iv. Age, Birth date 
v. Sex 
vi. Post-op location  
vii. Surgeon 
viii. Anesthesiologist, anesthetic type 
ix.  Procedure code, procedure description  
x.  Diagnosis 
xi. Case #  
xii. Admitting process 
xiii. Date of Pre-Admission clinic visit  
xiv. Special considerations re isolation precautions and blood products  
xv.  Comment field with special instructions regarding patient care or 
equipment required 
 
 
J. The time allocated will be  defined as follows: 
i. Setup/ start: time allotted for setting up the case in the room 
ii. Patient in – time the patient enters the room 
iii. Patient out – time the patient is expected to leave the room 
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iv. Total room time: Includes the time between when the patient enters and 
leaves the room.(*This includes patient positioning, anesthesia induction 
and extubation time, skin to skin time as well as preparing the patient for 
leaving the room e.g. dressings and drape removal etc.) 
K. The difference between patient out time and the next case patient set up time is 
the time allotted for cleaning the room 
L. OR Booking Package – The package that must be submitted to the OR Booking 
clerk to indicate the need for a patient to be scheduled for elective surgery. The 
package contains the OR booking form, procedure consent, a history and signed 
patient questionnaire. 
 
 
2. Process 
 
A. Scheduled cases: The OR booking package must be submitted to the booking 
clerk within 14 calendar days of the anticipated surgical date. If the block time is 
not fully booked within the 14 days then the service that has that time allocated 
will be notified. The office will have 48 hrs to indicate if a different surgeon within 
that department will be using the remaining time and the time must be booked 
and a complete package received within 48 hrs. Time not scheduled within 10 
days of the surgical date will be made available for urgent bookings. 
B. Urgent cases: Patients that require surgery within 48 hrs and the surgeon does 
not have block time available may request access to urgent time. The request 
must include the patient name, birth date, location, surgeon, procedure code and 
description, skin to skin time and anticipated LOS. Urgent case time will be 
offered based on a first come/ first served basis by the OR booking clerk 
supervisor. (These cases will then become scheduled and accommodated 
through the Pre-Admission assessment process if appropriate, considering 
the patient’s status, location and capacity within the Pre-Admission clinic.) 
C. Slate “ cut off “ time – The time after which the slate is considered final and no 
further changes may be made except to have patients cancelled who are not 
able to proceed to the OR as expected. The slate cut off for all sites will be 1200, 
48 hrs ahead of the calendar date. 
D. Any unscheduled OR time made available after slate cut off will be allocated for 
urgent and emergency cases. 
 
Emergency cases will be booked through the OR control desk and scheduled for surgery using 
the designated “Emerg” rooms 
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Priorities for Emergency Surgery – Guidelines 
 
All emergency surgeries are to be classified by the attending surgeon according to the following 
priorities when the surgery is booked on the emergency list. 
 
Priority 1 Required within 1 hour to save life, limb, or organ 
Priority 1b Required within 4 hours, Trauma Surgery only 
Priority 2 Required within 8 hours to save life, limb, or organ 
Priority 3 Ideally done within 24 hours, but not more than 48 hours, then on the 
slate 
Priority 4 Urgent elective to facilitate medical treatment, patient discharge or bed 
utilization, bumped (not cancelled) surgery. 
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Appendix C 
Little’s Law applies to any queuing system in steady state.  Steady state in this context means that 
over time the number of inputs is equal to the number of outputs.  The Law simply states that the 
expected number of items in the system is equal to the rate of arrival of inputs multiplied by the 
average processing time of an input. 
 
𝐿 = 𝜆𝑊 
 
L is the number of items in the system 
λ is the arrival rate 
W is the average time each item spends in the system (including the queue)  
 
 
For a single server, first-in, first-out system, the PK formula provides the expected length of time 
spent in the queue before processing (inventory buffer): 
 
𝑊𝑞 =
1
𝜇
 
𝜌
1 − 𝜌
  
𝑐𝑎
2 + 𝑐𝑠
2
2
  
 
Wq is the waiting time in queue 
1/μ is the average service time (actual process) 
ρ is the expected number in service or utilization  𝜌 = 𝜆 𝜇  , in other words, the number in 
service is equal to the rate of arrival multiplied by the processing time 
 
𝑐𝑎
2+𝑐𝑠
2
2
   represents the variability seen in rate of input and variability in processing times.  This 
term can be defined as V (the variability factor) 
 
 
The total expected inventory (items in queue and in work in process) is: 
 
𝐿 = 𝐿𝑞 + 𝜌 
 
Then, separating the queue from work in process and substituting Little’s Law, gives: 
 
𝐿 =  𝜆𝑊𝑞 + 𝜌 
 
Substituting the PK formula then gives: 
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𝐿 = 𝜌 1 +  
𝜌
1 − 𝜌
  𝑉 
 
This demonstrates the trade-off of inventory (L), utilization (ρ), and variability (V).  When 
variability rises, utilization must fall in order to maintain the same inventory (queue length); 
similarly, in order to increase utilization, variability must decrease otherwise queue length will 
increase.  This is the basis of the OM triangle. 
 
Reference 
 
Schmidt, Glen M.  Teaching the OM triangle.  Operations Management Education Review.  2005 
(1): 87-104. 
  84 
Appendix D 
Selection from data collected on X-Times of various procedures (representative buckets): 
Procedure
Code
Procedure Description # of Cases Min X Time Max X Time Std Dev X 
Time
Avg X Time Olympic 
Average
Time Bucket 
(Avg)
Time Bucket 
(Olympic 
37271 MASTECTOMY PARTIAL W/ AXILLARY NODE DISSECTION 44 24 60 8.8 37.5 35.5 45 30
62089 ORBITAL BIOPSY 7 22 66 16.2 37.6 25.0 45 30
39337 URETEROSCOPY COHERENT HOLMIUM YAG LASER 15 20 66 15.3 37.7 31.9 45 30
500249 VAGINAL RECTOCELE REPAIR 4 24 61 16.2 37.8 16.5 45 30
620882 ORBITOTOMY ANTERIOR COMPLICATED 5 24 62 14.4 37.8 20.6 45 30
34903 THIGH SOFT TISSUE TUMOR EXCISION 33 5 92 14.6 37.9 34.9 45 30
500192 MIS PELVIC LYMPHADENECTOMY 42 25 59 7.6 37.9 35.9 45 30
30051 INGUINAL NODE DISSECTION 10 25 70 14.2 38.4 28.9 45 30
310396 AICD - PACEMAKER 7 12 48 12.2 38.4 29.9 45 30
30047 HERNIORRHAPHY INCISIONAL 24 24 88 18.3 52.1 47.4 60 45
54709 FEMUR # INSERTION NAIL SYNTHES OSTEOTOMY 9 32 63 10.5 52.3 41.8 60 45
39065 PROSTATECTOMY RETROPUBIC 8 23 97 21.1 52.5 37.5 60 45
320161 DISCECTOMY ANTERIOR CERVICAL W/ILIAC CREST BONE GRAFT 9 39 61 7.5 52.7 41.6 60 45
320183 DEEP BRAIN STIMULATION STAGE I & II 19 18 104 20.8 52.8 46.4 60 45
34919 HIP TOTAL PRIMARY VERSYS/TRILOGY (MINI/STANDARD 
INCISION)
10 39 86 16.2 52.8 40.3 60 45
34116 KNEE TOTAL REVISION 63 31 88 12.1 53.5 51.6 60 45
24053 MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING 13 8 195 48.1 53.6 38.0 60 45
30014 COLOSTOMY 13 24 93 24.3 54.5 45.5 60 45
32046 VENTRICULO-PERITONEAL SHUNT 32 38 99 13.3 54.6 50.3 60 45
50209 MIS OOPHORECTOMY 81 22 73 8.7 39.2 38.0 45 45
24051 GDC COILING 64 15 210 26.4 67.3 63.7 75 60
30981 RADIOFREQUENCY LIVER ABLATION 12 45 117 20.2 67.8 54.3 75 60
360024 THORACOTOMY 12 23 115 26.3 67.8 56.3 75 60
36032 MIS THORACOSCOPY (PLEUROSCOPY) POSSIBLE 
THORACOTOMY
72 35 148 21.1 67.9 65.4 75 60
34959 HIP TOTAL REVISION GMRS/TRILOGY 12 50 90 14.0 68.7 57.0 75 60
30507 MIS SEGMENTAL LIVER RESECTION 19 38 112 21.1 69.8 61.9 75 60
39040 RENAL TRANSPLANT RECIPIENT ST I 51 20 169 28.3 70.4 66.7 75 60
34953 HIP TOTAL REVISION ZMR XL/TMR 12 56 98 11.9 70.8 57.9 75 60
391013 CYSTECTOMY RADICAL W/ILEAL LOOP MALE 29 41 137 19.4 70.8 64.7 75 60
310574 CABG X5 & IMA OR BIMA 22 20 93 15.8 71.3 66.2 75 60
39345 MIS NEPHRECTOMY LIVING RELATED KIDNEY DONOR 43 38 83 10.2 57.3 54.5 60 60
99010 CAROTID THROMBOENDARTERECTOMY 135 27 152 14.5 57.4 56.1 60 60
34932 FEMUR DISTAL RESECTION & RECONSTRUCTION W/ GMRS 2 48 67 13.4 57.5 57.5 60 60
44041 SPINE LUMBAR LAMINECTOMY 37 31 110 15.5 57.7 53.9 60 60
99001 ABDOMINAL AORTIC ANEURYSMECTOMY 47 62 183 25.4 96.0 90.8 75 75
30021 HEPATIC ARTERY ANEURYSM REPAIR 1 97 97 97.0 97.0 75 75
30251 HEPATOPLASTY OF HEPATIC CYST MARSUPIALIZATION +/OR 
DRAINAGE
2 81 118 26.2 99.5 99.5 75 75
310392 VALVE AORTIC & MITRAL & TRICUSPID REP 3 81 118 18.5 99.7 99.7 75 75
320281 CRANIOTOMY ARTERIOVENOUS MALFORMATION RESECTION 14 54 223 41.3 100.2 80.4 75 75
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Appendix E 
Turnaround Time (TAT) Policy 
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